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The equitable doctrine of laches can bar the infringement 
claim1 of a copyright owner who “acquiesces in a transaction and 
sleeps upon his rights,”2 a derivation of the ancient maxim, “equity 
aids the vigilant, not those who sleep on their rights.”3  To assert a 
successful laches defense, a “defendant must prove both an 
unreasonable delay by the plaintiff and prejudice to itself.”4  The 
viability of a laches defense hinges on a “mixed question of law 
and fact.”5  While it is not a “purely factual question requiring no 
knowledge of law to answer,” courts assess laches based on the 
facts surrounding a claim. 6   Before 1957, defendants invoked 
laches in copyright infringement claims brought against them 
within the applicable state statute of limitations provisions when 
plaintiffs delayed in bringing an action. 7   In 1957, Congress 
enacted a three-year statute of limitations for civil copyright 
                                                                                                             
1 17 U.S.C.A. § 501 (2012). 
2 S. Pac. Co. v. Bogert, 250 U.S. 483, 500 (1919) (McReynolds, J., dissenting) (citing 
Hayward v. Eliot Nat’l Bank, 96 U.S. 611 (1877)). 
3 Lyons P’ship, L.P. v. Morris Costumes, Inc., 243 F.3d 789, 797–98 (4th Cir. 2001) 
(citing Ivani Contracting Corp. v. City of New York, 103 F.3d 257, 259 (2d Cir. 1997)). 
4 Couveau v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 218 F.3d 1078, 1083 (9th Cir. 2000). 
5 Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 695 F.3d 946, 951 (9th Cir. 2012), cert. 
granted, 134 S. Ct. 50 (2013) (citing Piper Aircraft Corp. v. Wag-Aero, Inc., 741 F.2d 
925, 937 (7th Cir. 1984)). 
6 Id. 
7 See, e.g., Callaghan v. Myers, 128 U.S. 617 (1888); Machaty v. Astra Pictures, 197 
F.2d 138 (2d Cir. 1952); Harold Lloyd Corp. v. Witwer, 65 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1933); 
Werner Co. v. Encyclopedia Britannica Co., 134 F. 831 (3d Cir. 1905); Greenbie v. 
Noble, 151 F. Supp. 45 (S.D.N.Y. 1957); Edward B Marks Music Corp v. Wonnell, 61 F. 
Supp. 722 (S.D.N.Y. 1945); W. Pub. Co. v. Edward Thompson Co., 169 F. 833 
(C.C.E.D.N.Y. 1909). 
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claims 8  to establish “highly desirable” national uniformity. 9 
Several circuits consider the application of the judicially created 
doctrine of laches “in tension with Congress[ional] intent.”10 
Since 2001, a severe split has existed across the circuits over 
the availability of laches in infringement claims initiated within the 
Copyright Act’s statute of limitations. 11   The Ninth Circuit 
permitted laches.12   The Fourth Circuit did not.13   The Second 
Circuit allowed equitable defenses to bar some remedies detailed 
in the Copyright Act, but not others.14   The Sixth, Tenth, and 
Eleventh Circuits deferred to the federal statute of limitations, 
except in certain “compelling,” 15  “extraordinary,” 16  or “rare” 17 
cases.  The Supreme Court granted certiorari to Petrella v. Metro-
Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., a Ninth Circuit case in which Metro-
Goldwyn-Mayer Studios asserted a laches defense against Paula 
Petrella’s infringement claim over the book and two screenplays 
that served as the basis for the film Raging Bull.18  The Court 
reversed the Ninth Circuit’s decision and remanded the case to the 
District Court.19  In a majority opinion by Justice Ginsburg, the 
Court held that laches cannot preclude a claim for legal relief 
brought within the statute of limitations, but may bar equitable 
relief in “extraordinary circumstances.” 20   The recent Petrella 
decision effectively resolves the circuit split over the availability of 
                                                                                                             
8 See Act of Sept. 7, 1957, Pub. L. No. 85-313, 71 Stat. 633 (reenacted without 
alteration in the Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2586 (codified at 17 
U.S.C. § 507(b))). 
9 S. REP. NO. 85-1014, at 2 (1957), reprinted in 1957 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1961, 1962. 
10 Petrella, 695 F.3d at 958. 
11 See, e.g., id.; Peter Letterese & Assocs., Inc. v. World Inst. of Scientology Enters. 
Int’l, 533 F.3d 1287 (11th Cir. 2008); Chirco v. Crosswinds Cmtys., Inc., 474 F.3d 227 
(6th Cir. 2007); Jacobsen v. Deseret Book Co., 287 F.3d 936 (10th Cir. 2002); Lyons 
P’ship, L.P. v. Morris Costumes, Inc., 243 F.3d 789 (4th Cir. 2001); New Era Publ’ns 
Int’l v. Henry Holt & Co., 873 F.2d 576 (2d Cir. 1989). 
12 See Danjaq L.L.C. v. Sony Corp., 263 F.3d 942, 956 (9th Cir. 2001). 
13 See Lyons P’ship, 243 F.3d at 806. 
14 See New Era Publ’ns Int’l, 873 F.2d at 584–85. 
15 Chirco, 474 F.3d at 233. 
16 Peter Letterese & Assocs., 533 F.3d at 1320. 
17 Jacobsen, 287 F.3d at 951. 
18 Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 695 F.3d 946, 958 (9th Cir. 2012). 
19 Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., No. 12-1315, 2014 WL 2011574 (U.S. May 
19, 2014). 
20   Id. at *4. 
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laches, while delineating when defendants may invoke the 
equitable defense.  
Part I evaluates the availability of laches in copyright 
infringement claims brought within the Copyright Act’s statute of 
limitations before the Petrella decision.  Part I examines how 
courts determine if a defendant sufficiently evidences the elements 
of laches to assert a viable defense.  To provide context, Part I 
traces the application of laches both before and after the 1957 
adoption of the statute of limitations.  Acknowledging the tension 
between a judicially created doctrine and a congressionally created 
statute, Part I explains how courts decide the availability of laches 
in a copyright case, given the statute of limitations.  Finally, Part I 
addresses the severe circuit split in the United States court of 
appeals system over the availability of laches. 
Part II elucidates the underlying reasons for the conflicts over 
the availability of laches.  Supreme Court decisions applying 
equitable doctrines in cases involving federally codified statutes 
provide reasoning for both those in favor of the availability of 
laches in copyright claims and those opposed.  Translating this 
reasoning into Copyright law, Part II analyzes the tension arising 
from the interpretations among the circuits of the availability of 
laches, given the remedial purpose of the Copyright Act and 
Congress’s particular purpose of creating a national uniformity in 
amending the Act to include a statute of limitations.  Part II 
distinguishes the conflicts surrounding the availability of laches in 
copyright cases involving discrete acts of infringement from the 
conflicts in claims arising from continuing acts of infringement.  
Finally, Part II presents the conflicts over addressing equitable 
considerations in cases guided by the bright-line law of statutory 
provisions. 
Part III offers an alternative resolution to the conflict in the 
United States court of appeals system over the availability of 
laches in copyright infringement claims brought within the statute 
of limitations.  Part III draws on the reasoning in National 
Railroad Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, which differentiated the 
availability of equitable defenses for discrimination claims based 
on discrete acts from hostile work environment claims based on 
repeated conduct, to suggest a framework by which the Court may 
856 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 24:851 
	
proceed.  Specifically, Part III suggests that the Supreme Court, in 
deciding Petrella, should have distinguished between cases 
involving discrete acts of infringement from those arising from 
continuing acts of infringement to resolve the conflict between the 
various circuits restricting laches, which commonly address 
discrete acts of infringement, and the presumption in favor of 
laches in the Ninth Circuit, which more frequently encounters 
continuing acts of infringement. 
I. THE EQUITABLE DOCTRINE OF LACHES IN COPYRIGHT LAW 
BEFORE PETRELLA V. METRO-GOLDWYN-MAYER 
A. The Elements of Laches 
For a defendant to assert a viable laches defense, the plaintiff 
must delay in filing suit.21  Courts measure the period of delay 
from “the time that the plaintiff knew or should have known about 
the potential claim at issue,”22 until a plaintiff initiates litigation.23  
A plaintiff’s knowledge of “the existence of the rights” is 
necessary, “for there can be no laches in failing to assert rights of 
which a party is wholly ignorant, and whose existence he had no 
reason to apprehend.”24  Actual notice or when a plaintiff “would 
have reasonably been expected to inquire about the subject matter” 
starts the delay period.25  The starting point for laches will, at 
times, differ from the starting point for the statute of limitations, 
which states that “[n]o civil action shall be maintained . . . unless it 
is commenced within three years after the claim accrued.”26  The 
statute of limitations is triggered only by the accrual of actual 
infringements, while the delay period in laches “may be triggered 
when a plaintiff knows or has reason to know about an impending 
infringement.”27  The delay sufficient to constitute laches begins 
                                                                                                             
21 See Danjaq L.L.C. v. Sony Corp., 263 F.3d 942, 952 (9th Cir. 2001). 
22 Id. (citing Kling v. Hallmark Cards, Inc., 225 F.3d 1030, 1036 (9th Cir. 2000)). 
23 See Danjaq, 263 F.3d at 952 (citing Jackson v. Axton, 25 F.3d 884, 889 (9th Cir. 
1994)). 
24 Kling, 225 F.3d at 1036 (citing Halstead v. Grinnan, 152 U.S. 412, 417 (1894)). 
25 See id. at 1036 (citing Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc. v. SciMed Life Sys., Inc., 
988 F.2d 1157, 1161 (Fed. Cir. 1993)). 
26 17 U.S.C. § 507(b) (2012). 
27 Kling, 225 F.3d at 1038. 
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when a plaintiff knows or has reason to know of an actual or 
intended infringing act. 
The delay must be unreasonable to constitute laches.28  Courts 
look to the cause of the delay to determine if it is unreasonable.29  
Delay is reasonable when it is necessitated by “the exhaustion of 
remedies through the administrative process;”30 when its purpose is 
“to evaluate and prepare a complicated claim;”31 and when it is 
used “to determine whether the scope of proposed infringement 
will justify the cost of litigation.” 32   Courts consider delay 
unreasonable when the plaintiff intends on “capitaliz[ing] on the 
value of the alleged infringer’s labor, by determining whether the 
infringing conduct will be profitable.”33  Courts do not tether the 
reasonableness of delay to the actual time elapsed, though time is 
often one significant factor.  The Second Circuit in Haas v. Leo 
Feist held “[a] few weeks’ delay in the case of a song so 
ephemeral . . . may have the same effect as 16 years, when the 
publication is a legal encyclopedia in 30 volumes.” 34   The 
reasonableness of a delay depends on its cause, as well as the time 
elapsed. 
The unreasonable delay must result in prejudice to the 
defendant. 35   Courts recognize both evidentiary prejudice and 
expectations-based prejudice in laches. 36   Evidentiary prejudice 
encompasses “lost, stale, or degraded evidence” and “witnesses 
whose memories have faded or who have died.”37  Expectations-
based prejudice requires a defendant to show that it “took actions 
                                                                                                             
28 See Danjaq, 263 F.3d at 954. 
29 See id. 
30 Id. (citing Couveau v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 218 F.3d 1078, 1083–84 (9th Cir. 2000)). 
31 Danjaq, 263 F.3d at 954 (citing Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int’l, Inc., 831 F. Supp. 
202, 219 (D. Mass. 1993), rev’d on other grounds, 49 F.3d 807 (1st Cir.1995), aff’d, 516 
U.S. 233 (1996)). 
32 Id. at 954. 
33 Id. (citing Haas v. Leo Feist, Inc., 234 F. 105, 108 (S.D.N.Y. 1916)). 
34 Haas, 234 F. at 108; see discussion infra Part I.B. 
35 See Hoste v. Radio Corp. of Am., 654 F.2d 11, 12 (6th Cir. 1981). 
36 See Danjaq, 263 F.3d at 955. 
37 Id. (citing Jackson v. Axton, 25 F.3d 884, 889–90 (9th Cir. 1994)); see also Trs. for 
Alaska Laborers–Constr. Indus. Health & Sec. Fund v. Ferrell, 812 F.2d 512, 518 (9th 
Cir. 1987); Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int’l, Inc., 831 F. Supp. 202, 220 (D. Mass. 
1993), rev’d on other grounds, 49 F.3d 807 (1st Cir.1995), aff’d, 516 U.S. 233 (1996). 
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or suffered consequences” it may have avoided, had the plaintiff 
initiated litigation without unreasonable delay.38 
Courts determine expectations-based prejudice by balancing 
the effects of the delay in light of the circumstances surrounding a 
claim: 
If only a short period of time has elapsed since the 
accrual of the claim, the magnitude of the prejudice 
required before the suit should be barred is great, 
whereas if the delay is lengthy, prejudice is more 
likely to have occurred and less proof of prejudice 
will be required.39 
A defendant can establish expectations-based prejudice by 
showing that, for example, “during the delay, it invested money to 
expand its business or entered into business transactions based on 
[its] presumed rights.”40  Prejudice can result from the “coming 
into existence of business plans and relationships based on reliance 
on the state of affairs challenged by the claims of the litigation.”41  
Though reliance is typically associated with equitable estoppel,42 
the potential economic effect of a plaintiff’s unreasonable delay on 
a defendant’s business concerns satisfies the prejudice element of 
laches. 
B. The Application of Laches in Copyright Infringement Cases 
Courts have applied laches in copyright cases in several 
circuits, both before and after the 1957 adoption of the Copyright 
Act’s statute of limitations.  In Gilmore v. Anderson, the court 
                                                                                                             
38 See Danjaq, 263 F.3d at 955 (citing Jackson, 25 F.3d at 889); Russell v. Price, 612 
F.2d 1123, 1126 (9th Cir. 1979); Lotus, 831 F. Supp. at 220. 
39 Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 695 F.3d 946, 953 (9th Cir. 2012), cert. 
granted, 134 S. Ct. 50 (2013) (citing Miller v. Glenn Miller Prods., Inc., 454 F.3d 975, 
1000 (9th Cir. 2006)). 
40 Id. (citing Miller, 454 F.3d at 999). 
41 Id. (citing HOWARD B. ABRAMS, LAW OF COPYRIGHT § 13:48 (2011)). 
42 See Lego A/S v. Best-Lock Const. Toys, Inc., 874 F. Supp. 2d 75, 81 (D. Conn. 
2012) (“A copyright defendant invoking equitable estoppel must show that (1) the 
plaintiff had knowledge of the defendant’s infringing acts, (2) the plaintiff either intended 
that the defendant rely on his acts or omissions or failed to act in such a manner that the 
defendant had a right to believe that it was intended to rely on the plaintiff’s conduct, (3) 
the defendant was ignorant of the true facts, and (4) the defendant relied on the plaintiff’s 
conduct to its detriment.” (citation omitted)). 
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considered the effects of delay in assessing if equity should bar the 
claim.43  The suit concerned the copyright of The Life of James A. 
Garfield, written by James R. Gilmore under the name of Edmund 
Kirke and alleged infringement by From Canal-Boy to President, 
written by defendant Horatio Alger, and published by defendant 
John R. Anderson. 44   Harper & Bros. acquired the book’s 
copyright in 1880. 45   Anderson published the book in 1881. 46  
Harper & Bros. assigned the copyright to Laura E. Gilmore in 
1886.47  Though the defendants did not claim that a statute of 
limitations barred recovery, “the lapse of time is said to meet the 
equity, if any, of the [plaintiff’s] case.”48  The court found the 
“conduct of the defendants has not been induced, nor their liability 
varied, by anything done or omitted to be done by those interested 
in the copyright” and thus “[n]othing is apparent adequate to cut 
off any right accrued.”49  Delay absent prejudice does not bar a 
claim. 
Judge Learned Hand provided an oft-cited justification for the 
application of equitable doctrines to copyright claims in the Haas 
opinion.50  Harry Haas brought the case against Leo Feist, Inc. over 
infringement of a copyrighted song, “You Will Never Know How 
Much I Really Cared.”51  Composed in the spring of 1914, the song 
was a failure upon its release, selling only 1,000 copies.52  William 
Cahalin, a co-author of “You Will Never Know How Much I 
Really Cared,” heard a song composed by Al Piantadosi entitled, “I 
Didn’t Raise My Boy To Be A Soldier” in December of 1914 and 
“at once was struck with the similarity between the chorus of 
Piantadosi’s song and Haas’s, but said nothing at the time.” 53  
Later that month, Feist began the publicity campaign for “I Didn’t 
                                                                                                             
43 Gilmore v. Anderson, 38 F. 846, 848 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1889). 




48 Id. at 848. 
49 Id. (citing Menendez v. Holt, 128 U.S. 514 (1888)) (discussing the application of 
laches in a trademark case). 
50 234 F. 105, 108 (S.D.N.Y. 1916). 
51 Id. at 106. 
52 Id. 
53 Id. 
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Raise My Boy To Be A Soldier,” placing advertisements in 
newspapers all over the country.54  Haas first heard the song in 
January of 1915 and he recognized the similarity between the 
choruses.55  Haas did nothing until March, when he consulted a 
lawyer, who brought suit on January 28, 1916, when the song “had 
long since run its course.”56  The court precluded the plaintiffs 
from recovering profits accrued after the date on which they had 
knowledge of the infringement.57  The court’s reasoning appears in 
the holdings for applying equitable defenses to copyright 
infringement claims in several jurisdictions:58 
It must be obvious to every one familiar with 
equitable principles that it is inequitable for the 
owner of a copyright, with full notice of an intended 
infringement, to stand inactive while the proposed 
infringer spends large sums of money in its 
exploitation, and to intervene only when his 
speculation has proved a success.  Delay under such 
circumstances allows the owner to speculate 
without risk with the other’s money; he cannot 
possibly lose, and he may win.59 
The concurring opinion in the Ninth Circuit’s Petrella decision 
identified this passage as “a classic invocation of equitable 
estoppel, which is distinct from its equitable cousin, laches.”60  
However, the unreasonable delay and resulting expectations-based 
prejudice correspond to the elements of laches, which are easier to 
satisfy than the elements of equitable estoppel.61 




57 Id. at 108. 
58 See, e.g., Peter Letterese & Assocs., Inc. v. World Inst. of Scientology Enters., Int’l, 
533 F.3d 1287, 1320 (11th Cir. 2008); Chirco v. Crosswinds Cmtys., Inc., 474 F.3d 227, 
232 (6th Cir. 2007); Danjaq L.L.C. v. Sony Corp., 263 F.3d 942, 951 (9th Cir. 2001). 
59 Haas v. Leo Feist, Inc., 234 F. 105, 108 (S.D.N.Y. 1916). 
60 Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 695 F.3d 946, 959 (9th Cir. 2012) (Fletcher, 
J., concurring) cert. granted, 134 S. Ct. 50 (2013). 
61 See id. 
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C. The Statute of Limitations in Copyright Infringement Cases  
1. The Copyright Act’s Statute of Limitations 
Prior to 1957, the Copyright Act “prescribe[d] no limitation on 
the commencement of an action for infringement.” 62   In “the 
absence of any Federal statute of limitations,” an action was 
“limited by the limitation existing for the class of actions to which 
it belongs, in the state where the action was brought.”63  Amongst 
the courts it was “settled that the applicable state statute of 
limitations governs.”64 
In 1957, Congress amended the 1909 Copyright Act to include 
a three-year statute of limitations for civil copyright claims. 65  
Congress determined it “highly desirable to provide a uniform 
(limitations) period throughout the United States” that would deter 
forum shopping. 66   The Senate Report accompanying the 
amendment addressed these forum shopping concerns, stating 
“[n]aturally the makers of motion pictures and the publishers of 
songs and books and other works of arts are interested in obtaining 
a short statutory period while persons who might have their 
copyrights infringed are interested in a longer period.”67  Congress 
feared localized statutes of limitations providing disparate 
treatment of copyright cases could breed forum shopping among 
claimants. 68   The Senate Report specified that California had 
adopted a relatively short statute of limitations “due to the 
centralization of the movie industry.”69  The Senate Report noted 
that states “applied longer periods for the commencement of 
actions”  “[w]here the incident of copyright actions is low.”70  The 
possible forum shopping for copyright claims brought in different 
                                                                                                             
62 Carew v. Melrose Music, 92 F. Supp. 971 (S.D.N.Y. 1950). 
63 Brady v. Daly, 175 U.S. 148, 158 (1899). 
64 Carew, 92 F. Supp. at 971. 
65 See Act of Sept. 7, 1957, Pub. L. No. 85-313, 71 Stat. 633 (reenacted without 
alteration in the Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified at 17 
U.S.C. § 507(b))). 
66 S. REP. NO. 85-1014, at 2 (1957), reprinted in 1957 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1961, 1962. 
67 Id. 
68 See Id. 
69 Id. 
70 Id. 
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regions led Congress to amend the Copyright Act to include a 
statute of limitations. 
The Senate Report addressed “various equitable situations on 
which the statute of limitations is generally suspended” that federal 
district courts would likely take into account.71  The Senate Report 
cited the House Report in identifying some equitable 
considerations, including cases “where there exist the disabilities 
or [sic] insanity of [sic] infancy, absence of the defendant from the 
jurisdiction, fraudulent concealment, etc.”72  Mentions of laches or 
equitable estoppel were absent from this list of anticipated 
equitable considerations applicable in copyright cases.  The Senate 
Report noted that the adoption of a federal limitations period 
would extinguish equitable defenses, such as laches.73  The Senate 
Report cited the House Report, which stated, “courts generally do 
not permit the intervention of equitable defenses or estoppel where 
there is a [statute of] limitation[s].”74  The circuit split surrounding 
the availability of laches largely focuses on whether, given the 
amendment in 1957, Congress intended to preclude the application 
of equitable doctrines in copyright claims brought within the 
statute of limitations.  From the Senate Report and the House 
Report, the inferred Congressional intent in amending the 
Copyright Act to include the statute of limitations aimed to 
establish uniformity and predictability and to preclude the 
availability of equitable defenses, including laches. 
2. The Continuing Wrong Doctrine, the Rolling Statute of 
Limitations, and the Re-Releases Issue 
Two approaches predominate for measuring infringement that 
occurs over an extended period of time: the continuing wrong 
doctrine and the rolling statute of limitations.  The continuing 
wrong doctrine, put forth in Taylor v. Meirick, holds that in a series 
of infringing acts, only the last such act need occur within the 
                                                                                                             
71 Id. at 3 (citing H. REP. NO. 85-150); S. REP. NO. 85-1014, reprinted in 1957 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1961, 1963). 
72 S. REP. NO. 85-1014, at 2 (1957), reprinted in 1957 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1961, 1962 (citing 
H. REP. NO. 85-150); S. REP. NO. 85-1014, reprinted in 1957 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1961, 1963. 
73 See Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 695 F.3d 946, 958 (9th Cir. 2012), cert. 
granted, 134 S. Ct. 50 (2013). 
74 H. REP. NO. 85-150; S. REP. NO. 85-1014. 
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three-year statutory period in order for liability to attach to all acts 
of infringement.75  The initial infringing act, Meirick’s copying of 
Taylor’s fishing maps of Illinois lakes, and the sales of the 
resulting copies amounted to a “continuing wrong.” 76  The Ninth 
Circuit, in Roley v. New World Pictures, Ltd., 77  rejected the 
holding in Taylor. 78   Under Roley, damages for infringement 
claims take into account only the three years prior to filing.79  
Sutton Roley wrote a screenplay entitled Sleep Tight Little Sister, 
which he gave to Walter Coblenz of New World Entertainment 
Limited in hopes he would produce it.80  Coblenz declined, but two 
years later, in August 1987, he invited Roley to the screening of his 
new movie Sister, Sister, which Roley claimed was a production of 
his screenplay.81  Roley alleged infringement after first viewing the 
screening of Sister, Sister in August 1987, and argued that if any 
allegedly infringing conduct occurred within the three years 
preceding the filing of the action, he may reach back and sue for 
damages or other relief for all allegedly infringing acts.82  The 
Ninth Circuit rejected this assertion.83  If Roley provided evidence 
of continuing copyright infringements, “an action [could] be 
brought for all acts that accrued within the three years preceding 
the filing of the suit.”84  Claims older than three years would be 
barred by the statute of limitations under the rolling statute of 
limitations.85  Unreasonable delay is more likely to be present in 
claims brought in courts applying the continuing wrongs approach, 
as “party could, theoretically, delay filing suit indefinitely.” 86  
                                                                                                             
75 Taylor v. Meirick, 712 F.2d 1112 (7th Cir. 1983). 
76 Id. 
77 Roley v. New World Pictures, Ltd., 19 F.3d 479, 481 (9th Cir. 1994). 
78 Id. 
79 Id.; see also Bruce v. Weekly World News, Inc., 310 F.3d 25, 27 n.1 (1st Cir. 2002). 
80 Roley, 19 F.3d at 480. 
81 Id. 
82 Id. at 481. 
83 Id. 
84 Id. (citing Baxter v. Curtis Indus., Inc., 201 F. Supp. 100, 101 (N.D. Ohio 1962)); 
see also Kalem Co. v. Harper Bros., 222 U.S. 55, 61–62 (1911); Hampton v. Paramount 
Pictures Corp., 279 F.2d 100, 105 (9th Cir. 1960); Universal Pictures Co. v. Harold Lloyd 
Corp., 162 F.2d 354, 365 (9th Cir. 1947); Cain v. Universal Pictures Co., 47 F. Supp. 
1013, 1017–18 (S.D. Cal. 1942). 
85 See Roley, 19 F.3d at 481. 
86 Hot Wax, Inc. v. Turtle Wax, Inc., 191 F.3d 813, 821 (7th Cir. 1999). 
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Unreasonable delay is less likely to be present in claims brought in 
courts that adopt the rolling statute of limitations theory, because 
of the three-year window.  A court’s decision to adopt either the 
continuing wrongs or rolling statute of limitations approach 
potentially affects the application of laches. 
The Ninth Circuit addressed the statute of limitations issue 
concerning re-releases in the Danjaq L.L.C. v. Sony Corp. 
decision.87  The theatrical release of the films in question occurred 
decades before the plaintiff brought the claim, but the defendant 
began to exploit the films on DVD at a much later date.  The court 
posed the question, “how can it fairly be said that a lawsuit filed in 
1998, relating to a DVD released in 1997 was ‘delayed’?”88  The 
court held that “[w]here, as here, the allegedly infringing aspect of 
the DVD is identical to the alleged infringements contained in the 
underlying movie, then the two should be treated identically for 
purposes of laches.” 89   The court found the “perfect overlap” 
between the films as originally released and as offered decades 
later on DVD tied the infringement claim over a re-release to 
laches regarding the original work.90  However, the Ninth Circuit 
concluded, “[t]his is not to say that every re-release must always be 
treated like the original.”91  The “perfect overlap” appeared to be 
the exception, not the rule: “when old works are transferred to new 
media, they often are modified or adorned with new material,” 
including “[c]ompact discs” with “bonus tracks” and “DVDs” with 
“ʻbonus materials’ such as alternate audio commentary.” 92  
Additional materials accompanying re-releases “may be separately 
protectable for intellectual property purposes” and “might be 
treated differently” than the underlying work “for purposes of 
laches.”93  Though in Danjaq it was unnecessary to examine the 
effect of additional materials in re-releases on the delay element of 
laches, the Ninth Circuit recognized the issue as a common 
                                                                                                             
87 263 F.3d 942 (9th Cir. 2001). 
88 Id. at 953. 
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occurrence in future copyright infringement claims involving re-
releases and potential continuing acts of infringement. 
D. The Circuit Split Over the Availability of Laches in Copyright 
Infringement Claims Brought Within the Statute of Limitations 
1. The Fourth Circuit: Statute of Limitations is the “End of the 
Matter”94 
The Fourth Circuit does not allow laches for copyright 
infringement claims brought within the statute of limitations.95  In 
Lyons Partnership, L.P. v Morris Costumes, Inc., Lyons 
Partnership owned all of the intellectual property rights to the 
character “Barney.”96  Morris Costumes operated a retail costume 
rental establishment.97  The complaint alleged that the defendants 
rented three different forms of the costume to the public, each of 
which infringed on the plaintiff’s Barney copyrights.98  Though the 
district court found that two of the three costumes infringed Lyons’ 
copyrights, it denied Lyons a remedy because the claims were 
barred by the statute of limitations and by the doctrine of laches.99  
The district court held that the four-year lapse between the time 
when Lyons first became aware of Morris’ acts of infringement 
and the commencement date of the lawsuit amounted to an 
“inexcusable” delay. 100   The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals 
reversed the district court’s ruling that all of the claims were barred 
by the statute of limitations and reversed the ruling that any claims 
were barred by laches.101 
Concerns about separation of powers frame the Fourth 
Circuit’s approach to laches in federal claims.  “In deference to the 
doctrine of separation of powers, the [Supreme] Court has been 
                                                                                                             
94 Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 395 (1946) (see discussion infra Part II.A.1). 
95 See Lyons P’ship, L.P. v Morris Costumes, Inc., 243 F.3d 789, 796 (4th Cir. 2001). 
96 Id. at 795–96. (“Barney,” the title character of the “Barney & Friends” children’s 
television show, is a fat, purple stuffed animal, “ostensibly a dinosaur.” James Gorman, 
TELEVISION VIEW; Of Dinosaurs Why Must This One Thrive?, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 11, 
1993.). 




101 Id. at 806. 
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circumspect in adopting principles of equity in the context of 
enforcing federal statutes.”102  Citing Holmberg v. Armbrecht, the 
Fourth Circuit posited, “[i]f Congress explicitly puts a limit upon 
the time for enforcing a right which it created, there is an end of 
the matter.  The Congressional statute of limitation is 
definitive.”103  The Fourth Circuit defers to statutory provisions in 
completely restricting the availability of laches.  The Fourth 
Circuit cited other circuits to support their separation of powers 
issues.  The court in Lyons Partnership invoked the Second Circuit 
in considering the application of laches an attempt to “overrule the 
legislature’s judgment as to the appropriate time limit to apply for 
actions brought under the statute.”104  The court cited to the Ninth 
Circuit for “separation of powers principles” precluding the 
application of laches to bar a federal statutory claim timely filed 
under an express statute of limitations. 105   The Fourth Circuit 
concluded that when Congress creates a cause of action for 
traditional equitable remedies and specifies a statute of limitations 
for that action, the federal statute for that cause of action should 
govern.106 
The Fourth Circuit applied the statutory deference found in 
other areas of law to the Copyright Act.  In the Copyright Act, 
Congress created a civil cause of action by which plaintiffs may 
seek both damages and injunctive relief. 107   The statute of 
limitations provision states “[n]o civil action shall be maintained 
under the provisions of this Title unless it is commenced within 
three years after the claim accrued.”108  In Lyons Partnership, the 
court held that when a provision presents an explicit time 
limitation, a court is not free to shorten that period, even when a 
plaintiff seeks equitable relief.109  The Fourth Circuit held that the 
                                                                                                             
102 Id. at 798 (citing Oneida Cnty., N.Y. v. Oneida Indian Nation of New York State, 
470 U.S. 226, 262 n.12 (1985)). 
103 327 U.S. 392, 395 (1946). 
104 Ivani Contracting Corp. v. City of New York, 103 F.3d 257, 260 (2d Cir. 1997). 
105 See Miller v. Maxwell’s Int’l, Inc., 991 F.2d 583, 586 (9th Cir. 1993). 
106 Lyons P’ship, 243 F.3d at 798. 
107 See 17 U.S.C.A. §§ 502, 504 (2002). 
108 U.S.C.A. § 507(b) (2002). 
109 Lyons P’ship, 243 F.3d at 798. 
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Copyright Act’s statute of limitations controls and the laches 
defense is unavailable. 
2. The Eleventh Circuit: Laches Available “Only in the Most 
Extraordinary Circumstances” 
The Eleventh Circuit recognizes laches “only in the most 
extraordinary circumstances.”110  In Peter Letterese & Associates., 
Inc. v. World Institute of Scientology Enterprises, the Eleventh 
Circuit demarcated the availability of laches in copyright 
infringement claims brought within the statute of limitations.111  
This case involved a dispute over copyright protection in a book 
about sales techniques authored by Leslie Achilles “Les” Dane 
called Big League Sales Closing Techniques.112  Peter Letterese & 
Associates, Inc. (“PL&A”), the exclusive licensee of the copyright 
in Dane’s book, claimed that three Church of Scientology affiliates 
infringed its copyright by incorporating portions of the book into 
their instructional course materials.113  PL&A sought declaratory 
and injunctive relief.114  Dane knew of and participated in the use 
of his book since the mid-1980s when the Church hired him to 
travel to Scientology churches in the United States and abroad to 
deliver seminars. 115   The seminars focused on sales techniques 
found in his book that were included in the Church’s sales drills.116  
The district court accepted that the infringement occurred as 
alleged, but ruled for defendants, holding that Scientology’s 
incorporation of the text fell under the fair use doctrine and that 
PL&A’s suit was barred by laches.117  The Court of Appeals for 
the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision in three 
claims, but vacated and remanded the court’s application of the fair 
use doctrine and the laches defense in the remaining claim.118 
                                                                                                             
110 Peter Letterese & Assocs., Inc. v. World Inst. of Scientology Enters. Int’l, 533 F.3d 
1287, 1320 (11th Cir. 2008). 
111 Id. 
112 Id. at 1293. 
113 Id. 
114 Id. 
115 Id. at 1294. 
116 Id. 
117 Id. at 1298. 
118 Id. at 1293. 
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The Eleventh Circuit based its presumption of availability of 
laches on the Fifth Circuit’s views on the equitable doctrines in 
copyright claims.119  The Fifth Circuit restricted the availability of 
equitable defenses to counteract the problem of forum shopping 
through a general deference to the “uniform federal period of 
limitations.” 120   “In deciding that the equitable doctrine of 
tolling121 nonetheless applied to a copyright infringement claim,” 
the former Fifth Circuit observed, “the intent of the drafters was 
that the limitations period would affect the remedy only, not the 
substantive right, and that equitable considerations would therefore 
apply to suspend the running of the statute.”122  Prather v. Neva 
Paperbacks, Inc. held that courts “must look to general equitable 
principles to determine the proper disposition” of a plaintiff’s 
cause of action.123  In allowing tolling in copyright claims, the 
Fifth Circuit created a presumption that equitable doctrines, 
including laches, could apply in cases with a statute of limitations. 
In constricting the availability of laches, the Eleventh Circuit 
looked to the principles invoked by the Fourth Circuit in barring 
equitable doctrines.  While stating it “cannot agree with the 
conclusion of the Fourth Circuit, which is an unqualified ‘no,’” the 
Eleventh Circuit acknowledged the Fourth Circuit’s “invocation of 
separation of powers principles,” which counsel against the use of 
“the judicially created doctrine of laches to bar a federal statutory 
claim that has been timely filed under an express statute of 
limitations.” 124   The Eleventh Circuit maintains a “strong 
presumption that a plaintiff’s suit is timely if it is filed before the 
                                                                                                             
119 Prior to its creation, the districts comprising the Eleventh Circuit were in the Fifth 
Circuit.  Fifth Circuit decisions before October 1, 1981 are binding precedent in the 
Eleventh Circuit. See Peter Letterese & Assocs., Inc., 533 F.3d 1287, 1293 (citing Bonner 
v. City of Pritchard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981)). 
120 Id. at 1320 (citing Prather v. Neva Paperbacks, Inc., 446 F.2d 338, 339 (5th Cir. 
1971)). 
121 “Plaintiff’s ignorance of the claim as a result of defendant’s fraudulent concealment 
and plaintiff’s due diligence can constitute equitable tolling.” 1-12 MELVILLE B. NIMMER 
& DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 12.05 (Matthew Bender & Co. 2012) (citing 
Price v. Fox Entm’t Group, Inc., 473 Supp. 2d 446, 458–59 (S.D.N.Y. 2007)). 
122 Peter Letterese & Assocs., 533 F.3d at 1320 (citing Prather, 446 F.2d at 340). 
123 Id. 
124 Lyons P’ship, L.P. v. Morris Costumes, Inc., 243 F.3d 789, 798 (4th Cir. 2001). 
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statute of limitations has run.”125  Factoring in the basis for the 
Fourth Circuit’s bar, the Eleventh Circuit answers “a presumptive 
‘no’” to the availability of laches in copyright claims.126 
While there is a strong presumption against the availability of 
laches in the Eleventh Circuit, the doctrine will be recognized as a 
defense in a copyright claim, but “only in the most extraordinary 
circumstances” of uncertainty.127  In assessing the factors affecting 
the delay elements of laches, the Eleventh Circuit acknowledged 
that an owner “cannot be fully cognizant of all infringements that 
occur throughout the length and breadth of this country.”128  This 
proposition, introduced in a patent case, but also applicable in 
copyright claims, stated that defenses against infringement claims 
“present mixed questions of fact and law concerning which there is 
necessarily some doubt and uncertainty.”129  “Even where such 
extraordinary circumstances exist . . . laches serves as a bar only to 
the recovery of retrospective damages, not to prospective relief.”130  
The Eleventh Circuit reasoned that “permitting laches to operate as 
a bar on post-filing damages or injunctive relief would encourage 
copyright owners to initiate much needless litigation in order to 
prevent others from obtaining effective immunity from suits with 
respect to future infringements.”131  The Eleventh Circuit allows 
laches in “the most extraordinary of circumstances” and in those 
circumstances, laches bars only past damages, not prospective 
relief.132 
3. The Tenth Circuit: Laches Available in Rare Cases 
The Tenth Circuit holds that courts should generally defer to 
the Copyright Act’s three-year statute of limitations, restricting 
                                                                                                             
125 Peter Letterese & Assocs., 533 F.3d at 1320. 
126 Id. 
127 Id. (The Letterese opinion cited to the Tenth Circuit’s decision in Jacobsen (see 
discussion infra Part I.D.3) and the Sixth Circuit’s decision in Chirco (see discussion 
infra Part I.D.4.) to offer additional examples of “extraordinary circumstances.”). 
128 Id. at 1321 (citing A.C. Aukerman Co. v. R.L. Chaides Constr. Co., 960 F.2d 1020, 
1040–41 (Fed.Cir.1992)). 
129 Id. at 1321. 
130 Id. at 1321 (citing A.C. Aukerman Co., 960 F.2d at 1040–41). 
131 Peter Letterese & Assocs., 533 F.3d at 1321–22. 
132 See id. at 1320. 
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laches defenses to “rare cases.”133  In Jacobsen v. Deseret Book 
Co., Dr. Gene S. Jacobsen, a prisoner of war in the Philippines and 
Japan during World War II, wrote his personal memoir, entitled 
Who Refused to Die.134  Deseret Book Company published a book 
written by Dr. Dean Hughes entitled Children of the Promise, a 
fictional work written primarily for an audience comprised of 
members of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints.135  
Children of the Promise portrayed a Latter-day Saint family’s life 
during World War II and, in the book, the narrative of one of the 
family’s sons, closely resembled Dr. Jacobsen’s experience, as 
related in Who Refused to Die. 136   In granting Dr. Hughes’ 
summary judgment motion on the grounds that laches barred Dr. 
Jacobsen’s claims, the district court found “Jacobsen had 
knowledge of the material used by Hughes as early as 1994, and no 
later than 1996,” and “had ample opportunity to let Hughes know 
of his disapproval as early as 1996.”137  His delay in bringing a 
claim until 1999 caused “extreme prejudice to Hughes.”138  The 
Court of Appeals reversed the district court’s grant of summary 
judgment on the laches defense.139 
In determining the availability of laches in Jacobsen, the Tenth 
Circuit looked to United States v. Rodriguez-Aguirre, which held, 
“it has been observed that in deference to the doctrine of the 
separation of powers, the Supreme Court has been circumspect in 
adopting principles of equity in the context of enforcing federal 
statutes.” 140   Rodriguez-Aguirre, who had been convicted of 
money laundering, drug, and other offenses, sought the return of 
personal property that was seized by the federal government.141  
The Tenth Circuit held that “motions for return of seized property 
are governed by six-year statute of limitations, which generally 
                                                                                                             
133 Jacobsen v. Deseret Book Co., 287 F.3d 936, 950–51 (10th Cir. 2002). 




138 Id. at 949. 
139 Id. at 955. 
140 Id. at 950–51 (citing United States v. Rodriguez-Aguirre, 264 F.3d 1195, 1207–08 
(10th Cir. 2001)). 
141 Id. 
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may not be shortened by laches” and that “laches was in any event 
inapplicable, as the government did not show that it suffered 
material prejudice due to delay.”142  “[W]hen a limitation on the 
period for bringing suit has been set by statute, laches will 
generally not be invoked to shorten the statutory period,” although 
“it is possible, in rare cases, that a statute of limitations can be cut 
short by the doctrine of laches.”143  Rodriguez-Aguirre established 
the availability of laches in “rare” cases and Jacobsen applied this 
standard to copyrights. 
The Tenth Circuit also opened the door for laches by 
delineating why the statute of limitations suffices in Jacobsen.  
The defendant invoked Jackson v. Axton to support the availability 
of laches. 144   The Tenth Circuit distinguished Jacobsen from 
Jackson.145  In doing so, the court established the possibility of a 
laches defense arising from distinguishable facts in another case.146  
If laches were completely unavailable, an examination of the facts 
of the delay elements in Jackson and in Jacobsen would have been 
irrelevant. 
4. The Sixth Circuit: Laches Available in the Most 
Compelling of Cases 
The Sixth Circuit allows laches in “the most compelling of 
cases.”147  In Chirco v. Crosswinds Communities, Inc., Detroit-area 
real estate developers Michael Chirco and Dominic Moceri 
brought a copyright infringement suit against Crosswinds 
Communities and its principal shareholder, Bernard Glieberman, 
alleging that the defendants copied the plaintiffs’ architectural 
design for a “twelve-plex” condominium building. 148   The 
plaintiffs obtained copyrights on November 28, 1997 for the 
architectural plans.149  On December 31, 2000, Glieberman began 
building the Heritage Condominium development in Waterford 
                                                                                                             
142 Id. 
143 Id. 
144 See id. (citing  Jackson v. Axton, 25 F.3d 884, 888 (9th Cir. 1994)). 
145 See id. 
146 See id. 
147 Chirco v. Crosswinds Cmtys., Inc., 474 F.3d 227, 233 (6th Cir. 2007). 
148 Id. at 229. 
149 Id. at 230. 
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Township, Michigan, allegedly according to plans based directly 
upon or copied from the copyrighted plans.150  On April 1, 2001, 
the plaintiffs filed suit against Glieberman in federal district court, 
alleging copyright infringement and seeking injunctive and 
monetary relief.  During that suit’s discovery period, 151  the 
plaintiffs learned of Glieberman’s plans to build Jonathan’s 
Landing, another development, from those copyrighted designs.152  
On October 16, 2001, plaintiffs made a request for the Jonathan’s 
Landing plans and received them a week later.153  Plaintiffs took 
no action—even after development began for the 252-unit building 
in May of 2002—until November 14, 2003, when they filed a 
second federal law suit against Glieberman.154  By that time, 168 
of the planned 252 units had been constructed, 141 of them sold, 
and 109 were already occupied by the buyers.155  The district court 
granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment, ruling that 
laches barred the plaintiffs’ infringement claims.156  The Court of 
Appeals “reemphasize[d]” the availability of laches in the Sixth 
Circuit. 157   The plaintiffs’ failure to initiate “readily-available 
actions to abate the alleged harm” and the undue prejudice this 
inaction caused to the defendants and innocent third parties led the 
court to dismiss the plaintiffs’ efforts to mandate the destruction of 
the Jonathan’s Landing project.158 
The court in Chirco cited to the Fourth Circuit’s standard to 
establish a separate of powers concerns over the application of 
laches.159  “[W]hen considering the timeliness of a cause of action 
brought pursuant to a statute for which Congress has provided a 
limitations period, a court should not apply laches to overrule the 
legislature’s judgment as to the appropriate time limit to apply for 
actions brought under the statute.”160  In connection with copyright 
                                                                                                             
150 Id. 
151 Id. (referring to the Chirco v. Charter Oak Homes, Inc. (No. 01-71403) lawsuit.). 




156 Id. at 231. 
157 Id. at 236. 
158 Id. 
159 See Lyons P’ship, L.P. v. Morris Costumes, Inc., 243 F.3d 789, 797 (4th Cir. 2001). 
160 Chirco, 474 F.3d at 232 (citing Lyons P’ship, 243 F.3d at 798). 
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claims, separation of powers principles place the application of 
timeliness rule adopted by courts in deference to the legislatively 
prescribed statute of limitations.161 
 The Sixth Circuit sought further support in assessing the 
appropriate level of deference to the statute of limitations.162  The 
Tenth Circuit ruled that “[r]ather than deciding cases on the issue 
of laches, courts should generally defer to the three-year statute of 
limitations, 17 U.S.C. § 507(b), provided by the Copyright Act.”163  
In rare cases, the Tenth Circuit did acknowledge that “a court can 
apply laches in a copyright case.”164  The Sixth Circuit adopted the 
Tenth Circuit’s presumptive deference to the statute of limitations, 
while allowing laches in outlying cases.165 
Like the Tenth Circuit, the Sixth Circuit introduced the Ninth 
Circuit’s application of laches to assess availability in these 
outlying cases.166  Jackson v. Axton,167 Kling v. Hallmark Cards, 
Inc., 168  and Danjaq L.L.C. 169  comprise the Ninth Circuit’s 
presumption in favor of the availability of laches.  The court’s 
inclusion of the Ninth Circuit’s standards evidenced the Sixth 
Circuit’s willingness to apply laches in certain circumstances, 
situating its approach between the Ninth Circuit and the Fourth 
Circuit. 
The Sixth Circuit identified the “middle ground” on which it 
stands, between the Fourth Circuit’s strict bar on laches in cases 
with an explicit limitations provision and the more lenient 
application of the doctrine by the Ninth Circuit.170  In Tandy Corp. 
v. Malone & Hyde, Inc.,171 the Sixth Circuit explained its near-
exclusive preference for the statute of limitations: 
                                                                                                             
161 See Chirco, 474 F.3d at 231–32. 
162 See generally Chirco, 474 F.3d 227. 
163 Id. at 232 (citing Jacobsen v. Deseret Book Co., 287 F.3d 936, 950 (10th Cir. 
2002)). 
164 See Chirco, 474 F.3d at 232 (citing Jacobsen, 287 F.3d at 951). 
165 See generally Chirco, 474 F.3d 227. 
166 Id. at 232. 
167 25 F.3d 884, 888 (9th Cir. 1994). 
168 225 F.3d 1030, 1036–42 (9th Cir. 2000). 
169 263 F.3d 942, 951 (9th Cir. 2001). 
170 Chirco, 474 F.3d 227, 232 (6th Cir 2007). 
171 769 F.2d 362 (6th Cir.1985). 
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It enhances the stability and clarity of the law by 
applying neutral rules and principles in an 
evenhanded fashion rather than making the question 
purely discretionary . . . requires courts to make 
clear distinctions between threshold or special 
defenses or pleas in bar and the merits of the 
case . . . [and] enhances the rationality and 
objectivity of the process by preventing courts from 
short circuiting difficult issues on the merits by 
confusing or conflating the merits of an action with 
other defenses.172 
The court strongly restricted laches when an applicable statute 
referenced an explicit limitations period, but this was not an 
absolute bar.  In Hoste v. Radio Corp. of America,173 the Sixth 
Circuit reversed a district court ruling that barred recovery for the 
plaintiff by application of laches within the statute of limitations 
period, but it did so without ruling that the laches doctrine was 
always inapplicable in such a situation.174  In Broadcast Music, 
Inc. v. Roger Miller Music, Inc.,175 the court noted, “[a]lthough 
circuits are split as to whether laches is available as a defense 
under the Copyright Act, laches is available as an affirmative 
defense in a copyright action in the Sixth Circuit.”176  Although the 
Sixth Circuit sought to restrict the availability of laches to the most 
compelling copyright infringement cases, it explicitly recognizes 
that the defense is available.177 
The Sixth Circuit concluded that it allows laches in “what can 
best be described as unusual circumstances.”178  Claims brought 
within the limitations period provided by the Copyright Act will be 
allowed to proceed.179  However, “when the relief sought will work 
an unjust hardship upon the defendants or upon innocent third 
parties,” the courts “must ensure that judgments never envisioned 
                                                                                                             
172 Id. at 365. 
173 654 F.2d 11 (6th Cir.1981). 
174 Id. at 12; see also Chirco, 474 F.3d at 233. 
175 396 F.3d 762 (6th Cir. 2005). 
176 Id. at 783–84; see also Chirco, 474 F.3d at 233. 
177 Broadcast Music, Inc., 396 F.3d at 783–84. 
178 Chirco, 474 F.3d at 234. 
179 Id. at 236. 
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by the legislative drafters are not allowed to stand.”180  When relief 
will cause “unjust hardship,”181 the Sixth Circuit allows laches. 
5. The Second Circuit: Laches Bars only Injunctive Relief 
In the Second Circuit, laches bars injunctive remedies, but not 
legal remedies in copyright claims brought within the statute of 
limitations.  In New Era Publications International, ApS v. Henry 
Holt & Co., Inc., a fair use copyright case over the inclusion of 
various published and unpublished writings of L. Ron Hubbard in 
a biography, laches barred the plaintiff’s injunctive relief.182  The 
biography, written by Russell Miller, is entitled Bare-Faced 
Messiah: The True Story of L. Ron Hubbard. 183   New Era 
Publications International, ApS (“New Era”) held by license 
certain copyrights bequeathed to the Church of Scientology by 
Hubbard, upon his death in 1986.184  Henry Holt and Company, 
Inc. (“Henry Holt”) published Bare-Faced Messiah.185  New Era 
claimed the reproduction of Hubbard’s published and unpublished 
writings in Bare-Faced Messiah infringed on its copyrights.186 
Henry Holt asserted that New Era’s inaction barred its claims.  
The Second Circuit stated “equitable considerations [that] dictate 
denial of injunctive relief in this action” framed the possibilities of 
recovery for the infringement.187  New Era’s inaction occurred in 
spite of its knowledge of the book’s publication in the United 
States, and its knowledge of lawsuits commenced in 1987 to enjoin 
publication in England, Canada and Australia.188  New Era “failed 
to compare Holt’s book with the books published abroad; failed to 
inquire of Holt as to the planned date of publication in this country; 
and failed to take any steps to enjoin publication of the book until 
it sought a restraining order in May of 1988.”189  At the time New 
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Era requested an injunction, “12,000 copies of the book already 
had been printed, packed and (except for 3,000 copies left on a 
loading dock) shipped.” 190   The district court declined an 
injunction and limited the plaintiff to damages.  The Court of 
Appeals affirmed, concluding laches barred an injunctive relief.191 
In invoking laches, Holt pointed to New Era’s unreasonable 
delay in bringing the action and the resulting expectations-based 
prejudice it caused the defendant.192  New Era’s delay prevented 
the alteration of the book at a minimal cost in a timely manner.193  
If New Era had promptly sought an adjudication of its rights, the 
book might have been changed at minimal cost while there still 
was an opportunity to do so.194  Given the delay, a permanent 
injunction would amount to the “total destruction of the work,” 
since it would not have been economically feasible to reprint the 
book after deletion of the infringing material.195  New Era’s delay 
and the prejudice resulting from that delay constituted laches and 
compelled the denial of the injunction and constraint of New Era to 
recovering damages.196 
The Second Circuit limits laches to bar a claim filed within the 
statute of limitations to rare occasions.197  When the laches defense 
is available, it can bar only equitable relief, not legal relief.  “The 
prevailing rule [in the Second Circuit is] that when a plaintiff 
brings a federal statutory claim seeking legal relief, laches cannot 
bar that claim, at least where the statute contains an express 
limitations period within which the action is timely.” 198   The 
Second Circuit found that the judge in the district court did not 
abuse his discretion in declining an injunction against the 
publication of Bare-Faced Messiah, while “leaving New Era a 
                                                                                                             
190 Id. at 584. 
191 Id. at 577. 
192 Id. at 584 (citing Goodman v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 606 F.2d 800, 804 (8th 
Cir. 1979)). 
193 New Era Publ’ns Int’l, 873 F.2d at 577 (citing New Era Publ’ns Int’l, ApS v. Henry 
Holt & Co., 695 F. Supp. 1493, 1528 (S.D.N.Y.1988)). 
194 New Era Publ’ns Int’l, 873 F.2d at 577 
195 Id. 
196 Id. 
197 Ikelionwu v. United States, 150 F.3d 233, 238 (2d Cir. 1998). 
198 Ivani Contracting Corp. v. City of New York, 103 F.3d 257, 260 (2d Cir. 1997). 
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damages claim as to the very little, insignificant material unfairly 
used.” 199   In Second Circuit copyright claims, laches can bar 
injunctive relief, while allowing a plaintiff to pursue a claim 
seeking damages. 
6. The Ninth Circuit: A Presumption in Favor of Laches 
The Ninth Circuit has adopted a presumption in favor of laches 
for copyright claims brought within the statute of limitations.  
Danjaq L.L.C. v. Sony Corp. followed in a lineage of Ninth Circuit 
cases200 in holding that laches may bar a statutorily timely claim, 
when appropriate. 201   Danjaq L.L.C. and other entities 
(collectively, “Danjaq”) involved in the production and distribution 
of the James Bond films maintained that Ian Fleming created the 
James Bond character and that Fleming, along with producers 
Harry Saltzman and Albert “Cubby” Broccoli assigned the rights 
to them.202  Kevin O’Donovan McClory and Spectre Associates, 
Inc. (“McClory”) contended that McClory transformed Fleming’s 
cantankerous and unlikeable character into the now widely-
recognized debonair Bond and that they have a “significant stake” 
in the Bond franchise stemming from work on the Thunderball 
screenplay.203 
McClory’s period of delay in Danjaq satisfied the delay 
element in the Ninth Circuit and elsewhere.204  McClory’s alleged 
delay in this case spanned from the time of the Bond films’ initial 
release.205  From 1962’s Dr. No and 1977’s The Spy Who Loved 
Me, through his filing of a counterclaim in this suit in 1998, 
McClory took no legal action regarding the alleged 
infringements.206  According to McClory’s calculations, “various 
                                                                                                             
199 New Era Publ’ns Int’l, 873 F.2d at 597–98. 
200 See, e.g., Kling v. Hallmark Cards, Inc., 225 F.3d 1030, 1039 (9th Cir. 2000); 
Jackson v. Axton, 25 F.3d 884, 888 (9th Cir. 1994). 
201 Danjaq L.L.C. v. Sony Corp., 263 F.3d 942, 954 (9th Cir. 2001). 
202 Id. at 947. 
203 Id. 
204 Id. at 952; see also New Era Publ’ns Int’l v. Henry Holt & Co., 873 F.2d 576, 585 
(2d Cir. 1989) (holding that two year delay, combined with “severe prejudice,” supports 
laches); Jackson, 25 F.3d at 889 (holding that a delay of at least nineteen years is 
sufficient). 
205 Danjaq, 263 F.3d at 947. 
206 Id. at 952–53. 
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actions on his part should stop the clock on laches.” 207   He 
identified his 1961 lawsuit against Fleming as one such action, but 
the court excluded the effect of this suit, as it was not against 
Danjaq.208  McClory also sought to “stop the clock” in a 1976 
claim by McClory and Sean Connery that The Spy Who Loved Me 
infringed upon their script for James Bond of the Secret Service, an 
action in which they sought to enjoin Danjaq from infringing upon 
McClory’s rights in Thunderball.  The court held that litigation, 
brought and dismissed in 1976, stopped the clock on laches “only 
momentarily” and the twenty-two years since amounted to 
unreasonable delay.209  The district court concluded that McClory 
had knowledge of the alleged infringement since at least 1961 and 
that his only action to enforce any rights against Danjaq was the 
1976 litigation involving a claim unrelated to the case before them.  
The delay of either 21 or 36 years between McClory’s knowledge 
of the potential claims and the initiation of present litigation 
resulted in “overwhelming and uncontroverted evidence of 
substantial prejudice.” 210   The Court of Appeals affirmed the 
district court’s conclusion that Danjaq provided sufficient evidence 
of laches and that laches barred all of McClory’s claims.211 
Laches can bar all relief in the Ninth Circuit.212  The potential 
adversity this poses for plaintiffs is well-recognized.  Judge 
Fletcher, in the concurring opinion to Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-
Mayer, Inc., stated “[o]ur circuit is the most hostile to copyright 
owners of all the circuits.”213  Courts have observed the Ninth 
Circuit’s hostility to copyright owners as benefiting parties 
exploiting underlying works, such as motion picture studios: “[f]or 
better or worse, we are the Court of Appeals for the Hollywood 
Circuit.” 214   As noted in the Senate Report accompanying the 
Copyright Act’s statute of limitations, prior to the 1957, California 
                                                                                                             
207 Id. at 953. 
208 Id. 
209 Id. 
210 Danjaq, 263 F.3d at 950. 
211 Id. at 963. 
212 Id. 
213 Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 695 F.3d 946, 958 (9th Cir. 2012), cert. 
granted, 134 S. Ct. 50 (2013). 
214 White v. Samsung Electronics America, Inc., 989 F. 2d 1512, 1521 (9th Cir. 2000). 
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adopted a short statute of limitations in copyright claims to protect 
its movie industry.215  If the defendant in an infringement claim is 
not a “deliberate pirate” 216 or a “willful infringer,”217 the Ninth 
Circuit presumes the availability of laches to bar both legal and 
equitable remedies. 
The Ninth Circuit recognized that prejudice to a defendant 
caused by a plaintiff’s delay is typically sufficiently distanced from 
a defendant’s continuing behavior that “threatens future harm.”218  
Laches rarely affects prospective injunctive relief, given the 
separation in temporal concerns each doctrine addresses.219  The 
court in Danjaq cited to the Fourth Circuit to address this concept: 
“a prospective injunction is entered only on the basis of current, 
ongoing conduct that threatens future harm.  Inherently, such 
conduct cannot be so remote in time as to justify the application of 
the doctrine of laches.” 220   On appeal in Danjaq, McClory 
challenged the district court’s holding that laches barred “all of 
counterclaimants’ claims based on the rights at issue.”221  McClory 
argued that even if laches applies, it does not bar a prospective 
injunction against future infringement.222  The court affirmed the 
general propriety of this principle, but stated the rule is not 
absolute and, in the present case, “the feared future infringements 
are subject to the same prejudice that bars retrospective relief.”223  
McClory sought to establish an “original sin”: Richard Maibaum’s 
alleged access to the Thunderball script materials from which each 
                                                                                                             
215 S. REP. NO. 85-1014, at 2 (1957), reprinted in 1957 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1961, 1962; see 
also Brief for Petitioner at 14, Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 50 
(2013) (No. 12-1315) 2013 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 2155. 
216 Peter Letterese & Assocs., Inc. v. World Inst. of Scientology Enters. Int’l, 533 F.3d 
1287, 1320 (11th Cir. 2008); Chirco v. Crosswinds Cmtys., Inc., 474 F.3d 227, 232 (6th 
Cir. 2007); Danjaq, 263 F.3d at 951. 
217 Danjaq, 263 F.3d at 956–59. 
218 Id. 
219 See also 3 NIMMER, supra note 121, § 12.06 (“[E]ven if laches constitutes a bar to an 
action for past infringements of the same work, if the plaintiff acted without undue delay 
with respect to the particular infringement in issue, the defense of laches may not be 
raised as to such infringement.” (citing Danjaq, 263 F.3d at 960; Hampton v. Paramount 
Pictures Corp., 279 F.2d 100 (9th Cir.1960))). 
220 Lyons P’ship, L.P. v. Morris Costumes, Inc., 243 F.3d 789, 799 (4th Cir. 2001). 
221 Danjaq, 263 F.3d at 959. 
222 Id. 
223 Id. 
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infringement, James Bond movies past, present, and future, 
stemmed.224  “In a situation like this one,” the court held, “laches 
may bar prospective injunctive relief,” as “we already know that 
prospective claims will suffer from the very same evidentiary 
defects that bar older claims.”225  The court limited this holding to 
instances where “a special case that arises only when we know in 
advance that the defendant will be substantially prejudiced in its 
ability to defend future claimed infringements in just the same way 
that it was prejudiced with regard to prior alleged 
infringements.”226  Danjaq served to define a class of cases where 
laches could bar prospective injunctive relief. 
Petrella involves the application of laches to bar an 
infringement claim brought within the Copyright Act’s statute of 
limitations.227  Boxer Jake LaMotta (“LaMotta”) and writer Frank 
Peter Petrella (“F. Petrella”) collaborated on a book, Raging Bull 
(“the book”), and two screenplays (the “1963 screenplay” and the 
“1973 screenplay”) about LaMotta’s life and career, which 
allegedly became the basis for the movie Raging Bull (“the film”) 
released in 1980.228  In 1976, F. Petrella and LaMotta assigned all 
of their respective copyright rights in the book and “in and to those 
certain screenplays based on [the book] which were written in 
1963 and 1973” to Chartoff-Winkler Productions, Inc., 
“exclusively and forever, including all periods of copyright and 
renewals and extensions thereof.” 229   In 1978, United Artists 
Corporation, a wholly owned subsidiary of Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer 
Studios, Inc., acquired the motion picture rights to Raging Bull 
pursuant to a written assignment from Chartoff-Winkler 
Productions, Inc.230  United Artists registered a copyright in the 
film in 1980.231  In 1981, during the original 28-year term of the 
copyrights for the book and the two screenplays, F. Petrella died, 
                                                                                                             
224 Id. 
225 Id. at 960. 
226 Id. 
227 See Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 695 F.3d 946, 951 (9th Cir. 2012), cert. 
granted, 134 S. Ct. 50 (2013).  
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and his renewal rights in the works passed to his heirs.232  In 1990, 
F. Petrella’s daughter, Paula Petrella, learned of the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Stewart v. Abend233 and engaged an attorney to 
advise and assist her regarding her renewal rights.234  She alleged 
she is the sole owner of the F. Petrella interest in the book and the 
two screenplays.235  The attorney filed a renewal application for 
the 1963 screenplay on her behalf in 1991. 236   Following 
intermittent correspondence with Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer in the 
interceding years, Petrella initiated her claim in 2009.237 
The district court noted that Petrella’s lawsuit presents “an 
interesting variation on the problems that might arise from the fact 
that a derivative work cannot be exploited after the expiration of 
the original copyright term in the underlying work without the 
consent of the copyright owner in the renewal term.” 238   The 
district court held that defendants established each element of 
laches and granted their motion for summary judgment.239 
The Ninth Circuit in Petrella cited to Miller v. Glenn Miller 
Prods., Inc.240 and Jarrow Formulas, Inc. v. Nutrition Now, Inc.,241 
both trademark cases, to establish a presumption of laches.  “If a 
plaintiff files suit within the applicable period of limitations for his 
claim, there is a strong presumption that laches does not bar the 
claims.  Conversely, if any part of the alleged wrongful conduct 
occurred outside of the limitations period, courts presume that the 
                                                                                                             
232 Id. 
233 495 U.S. 207 (1990).  In Stewart v. Abend, the Court held that “when an author dies 
before a renewal period arrives, his statutory successors are entitled to renewal rights, 
even though the author has previously assigned the renewal rights to another party,” id. at 
219, and “[t]he owner of a derivative work does not retain [the] right to exploit that work 
when the death of the author causes the renewal rights in the preexisting work to revert to 
the statutory successors.” Id. at 207. 




238 Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., No. CV 09-72 (MANx) (C.D. Cal. Feb. 3, 
2010) at 83. 
239 Id. at 83–84. 
240 454 F.3d 975 (9th Cir. 2006). 
241 304 F.3d 829 (9th Cir. 2002). 
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plaintiff’s claims are barred by laches.” 242  The Lanham Act, the 
federal trademark statute, contains no statute of limitations for 
infringement claims.243  The Ninth Circuit relied on the holdings in 
trademark cases as authorities to support the availability of laches 
in a copyright case. 
The court in Petrella determined that the plaintiff’s various 
considerations influencing her inaction were unreasonable.  The 
court assessed the delay element of laches as “the period from 
when the plaintiff knew—or should have known—of the allegedly 
infringing conduct, until the initiation of the lawsuit in which the 
defendant seeks to counterpose the laches defense.”244  The district 
court found that it was “undisputed plaintiff was aware of her 
potential claims (as was MGM) since 1991,” when her attorney 
filed her renewal application for the 1963 screenplay.245  Petrella 
did not file her lawsuit until 18 years later, in January 2009.246  
Petrella testified that she did not contact the defendants to make 
them aware of any claims during this eighteen-year period because 
“the film was deeply in debt and in the red and would probably 
never recoup” and she “did not know there was a time limit to 
making such claims.”247  In the Ninth Circuit, delay in bringing a 
claim “to determine whether the scope of proposed infringement 
will justify the cost of litigation” may be reasonable. 248  However, 
the court considers “delay for the purpose of capitalizing “on the 
value of the alleged infringer’s labor, by determining whether the 
infringing conduct will be profitable” unreasonable.249  The Court 
of Appeals found that the district court did not err in finding 
                                                                                                             
242 Miller v. Glenn Miller Prods., Inc., 454 F.3d 975, 997 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing Jarrow 
Formulas, Inc. v. Nutrition Now, Inc., 304 F.3d 829, 835–37 (9th Cir. 2002) (citations 
omitted). 
243 Pub. L. 79-489, 60 Stat. 427, enacted July 6, 1946 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1051 et 
seq. (2012)). 
244 Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 695 F.3d 946, 952 (9th Cir. 2012), cert. 




248 Danjaq L.L.C. v. Sony Corp., 263 F.3d 942, 954 (9th Cir. 2001). 
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Petrella’s delays in notification and in filing suit—nineteen years, 
combined—were unreasonable.250 
Petrella’s delay resulted in evidentiary prejudice that affects a 
key factual discrepancy in this claim.  The evaluation of 
evidentiary prejudice in the district court stated that the 1963 
screenplay’s designation of F. Petrella as writing “in collaboration” 
with LaMotta is “not inconsistent” with Petrella’s claim of sole 
authorship, unless it can be shown that LaMotta made “some [de 
minimis] creative contribution to the screenplay.”251  In analyzing 
the effect Petrella’s delay had on resolving these factual disputes, 
the district court noted, “LaMotta is 88-years-old (now 92-years-
old) and has suffered myriad blows to his head as a fighter years 
ago,” severely limiting his capabilities as a reliable witness.252  
Petrella’s delay of over twenty years diminished the effectiveness 
of a witness central to the determination of material facts in her 
claim. 
Defendants in Petrella submitted extensive evidence of 
expectations-based prejudice to support a laches defense.  Edward 
J. Slizewski, Senior Vice President for Participations & Residuals 
for Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc., testified that since 1991, 
when Petrella knew of alleged infringement, the defendants 
“distributed the Film on a continuous basis in the United States and 
abroad, and . . . expended substantial financial and other resources 
as a part of this effort,” including “costs relating to marketing, 
advertising, distributing and otherwise promoting the Film in 
various media.” 253  Slizewski calculated that these costs totaled 
nearly $8.5 million in the United States alone.254  “These activities 
and expenditures were made based on the understanding and belief 
that the [defendants] have complete ownership and control of the 
Film.” 255   Petrella’s hypothetical timely action—filing suit in 
1991—would have given defendants an opportunity to litigate this 
                                                                                                             
250 Petrella, 695 F.3d at 952. 
251 Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., No. CV 09-72 (MANx) (C.D. Cal. Feb. 3, 
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claim before making these significant investments in the Film.256  
Petrella’s delay deprived the defendants of this opportunity. 257  
Slizewski stated that the defendants had, since 1991, entered into 
numerous agreements to license the Film, including various 
agreements authorizing television networks to broadcast Raging 
Bull through 2015.258  Petrella argued that the defendants earned a 
substantial profit as a result of the delay and would not have done 
anything different, or been in any better position, had she filed suit 
sooner.259  In Jackson, an ownership dispute over the song “Joy to 
the World,” the court found prejudice after a delay of eighteen to 
twenty-two years sufficient to support a laches defense, despite the 
defendant’s profit from the delay, and without any assertion that he 
would have acted differently had the suit been filed sooner.260  
During those 18 to 22 years, the defendant had “arranged his 
business affairs around the song, promoted the song as his own, 
licensed the song many times to third parties, and sold the song . . . 
numerous business transactions had been made in reliance on the 
defendant’s sole ownership of the song.”261  Petrella’s assertions 
that the defendants prospered her delay and that the defendants 
would not have conducted their business surrounding the licensing, 
distribution, and re-releases of Raging Bull any differently if she 
had initiated litigation in 1991 are irrelevant.  Metro-Goldwyn-
Mayer, Inc. based its actions in part on Petrella’s failure to assert 
her rights in the Film and these actions amounted to expectations-
based prejudice. 
II. SEPARATION OF POWERS CONFLICTS OVER THE AVAILABILITY 
OF LACHES IN THE PRESENCE OF A CONGRESSIONALLY CREATED 
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS  
The primary conflict across the circuits over the availability of 
laches stems from separation of powers concerns.  These concerns 





260 25 F.3d 884 (9th Cir. 1994), overruled on other grounds by Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 
510 U.S. 517 (1994). 
261 Id. at 889–90. 
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arise over the availability of the judicially created262 doctrine for 
claims brought within the congressionally codified statute of 
limitations.263  The Supreme Court, in certain cases, limits the role 
of the judiciary in prescribing actions in tension with 
congressionally created statutes or explicit statutes of limitations 
provisions.  More recently, the Supreme Court has allowed 
equitable doctrines, including laches, in cases with explicit filing 
requirements.  In determining the availability of equitable 
doctrines in federal statutory claims, the Supreme Court weighs the 
remedial purpose of the statute against the particular purpose of the 
filing requirement.  The application of laches in the various circuits 
corresponds to the weight the circuits accord to these factors. 
The circuit split over the availability of laches is a split over 
applying the equitable doctrine to claims involving discrete acts of 
infringement and those arising from continuing acts of 
infringement.  The Fourth Circuit’s definitive bar on laches and the 
Eleventh, Tenth, Sixth, and Second Circuit’s relegation of laches to 
rare cases generally applies to discrete acts of infringement.  The 
Ninth Circuit’s presumption in favor of laches occurs in frequently 
addressing continuing acts of infringement.  Additionally, an 
inconsistency appears in the remedies laches bars across the 
circuits.  The central conflict exists over the Ninth Circuit’s 
presumed availability of laches in claims arising from continuing 
acts of infringement and the remaining circuits deference to the 
federal statute of limitations for claims involving discrete acts of 
infringement.  This inconsistency across the circuits perpetuates 
the unpredictability the Copyright Act’s statute of limitations 
aimed to eliminate. 
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A. Supreme Court Reasoning on the Availability of Judicially 
Created Doctrines in Cases with Controlling Federal Statutes 
1. Beyond the Province and Duty of the Judiciary: Against the 
Availability of Equitable Doctrines 
A line of reasoning in Supreme Court decisions maintains that 
equitable defenses, including laches, should not be available in 
federal statutory claims with express statutory provisions.  The 
Supreme Court delineated one approach in Tennessee Valley 
Authority v. Hill. 264   In navigating the “irreconcilable conflict 
between operation of the Tellico Dam and the explicit provisions 
of § 7 of the Endangered Species Act,” the Court acknowledged 
that under the ruling of Hecht Co. v. Bowles,265 a federal judge “is 
not mechanically obligated to grant an injunction for every 
violation of law.” 266   However, the Court asserted that the 
“individual appraisal of the wisdom or unwisdom of a particular 
course consciously selected by the Congress is to be put aside in 
the process of interpreting a statute.”267  The role of the judiciary is 
to discern the “meaning of an enactment” and decide if the statute 
comports with the Constitution.268  Once these determinations are 
made, “the judicial process comes to an end.”269  Tennessee Valley 
Authority circumscribed the “province and duty of the judicial 
department” to interpreting meaning and assessing a statute’s 
constitutionality.270 
The Supreme Court specifically dealt with the availability of 
laches in a federal statutory claim in the presence of an explicit 
statute of limitations in Holmberg.271  The suit was brought on 
behalf of creditors of the Southern Minnesota Joint Stock Land 
Bank of Minneapolis to enforce the liability imposed upon 
shareholders of the Bank by § 16 of the Federal Farm Loan Act 
                                                                                                             
264 437 U.S. 153, 193 (1978). 
265 321 U.S. 321, 329 (1944). 
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after the bank closed in May 1932.272  Petitioners did not learn 
until 1942 that Jules S. Bache hid his ownership stake in the bank 
under the name Charles Armbrecht and thus they did not bring an 
action until November 1943.273  Respondents’ first defense stated 
that under New York Civil Practice Act § 53, the statute of 
limitations barred such an action after ten years.274  Respondents’ 
second defense claimed laches based on undue delay in the 
commencement of the action.275  The district court ruled against 
the respondents.276  The court of appeals reversed, reasoning that 
the New York statute of limitations was controlling and that the 
mere lapse of ten years barred the action.277  As this predominance 
of the statute of limitations over equitable doctrines is of 
“considerable importance in enforcing liability under federal 
equitable enactments,” the Supreme Court reviewed the holding.278  
The Supreme Court held, “[i]f Congress explicitly puts a limit 
upon the time for enforcing a right which it created, there is an end 
of the matter.”279  Adhering to the “definitive” nature of the statute 
of limitations, the Supreme Court ruled against the availability of a 
laches defense. 280   Notable for the purposes of exploring the 
current availability of laches in claims brought under the Copyright 
Act, the statute of limitations in Holmberg was state, not federal. 
2. “When Equity So Requires”: In Favor of the Availability of 
Equitable Doctrines 
The presence of a statute of limitations in federal statutory 
claims has not precluded the Supreme Court from considering the 
applicability of laches.  In National Railroad Passenger Corp., the 
Court held that while an actionable offense must occur within the 
statutory time period, the “application of equitable doctrines . . . 
may either limit or toll the time period” when a petitioner may file 
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a claim.281  In National Railroad Passenger Corp., Abner Morgan, 
Jr. sued National Railroad Passenger Corporation (Amtrak) under 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 282  alleging discrete 
discriminatory and retaliatory acts and the presence of a racially 
hostile work environment throughout his employment.283  Under 
Title VII, 284  a plaintiff must file a claim with the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) either 180 or 300 
days after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred.  
The Court considered “whether, and under what circumstances” a 
plaintiff may bring charges on a practice occurring “outside this 
statutory time period,” establishing that absolute adherence to the 
statute of limitations proved unnecessary.285 
In addressing hostile work environment claims, the Court 
included “behavior alleged outside the statutory time period” to 
assess a claim, “so long as an act contributing to that hostile 
environment takes place within the statutory time period.” 286  
Equitable doctrines, including laches, may limit or extend the time 
period within which a plaintiff may bring a claim.287  The question 
of when an unlawful employment practice has occurred 
predominated in this case for both discrete discriminatory acts and 
hostile work environment claims. 288   The Court distinguished 
between “[d]iscrete acts such as termination, failure to promote, 
denial of transfer, or refusal to hire,” which “are easy to identify,” 
and “hostile environment claims,” the very nature of which 
“involves repeated conduct.”289 
For discrete acts, “[c]ourts may evaluate whether it would be 
proper to apply such doctrines, although they are to be applied 
sparingly.” 290   The court bases the application of equitable 
                                                                                                             
281 Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 105 (2002). 
282 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2012). 
283 Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 536 U.S. at 104. 
284 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(e)(1) (2009). 
285 Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 536 U.S. at 105. 
286 Id. at 105. 
287 Id. 
288 Id. at 109–10. 
289 Id. at 114–15; see also 1 B. LINDEMANN & P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT 
DISCRIMINATION LAW 348–49 (3d ed. 1996). 
290 Id. at 113–14. 
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doctrines on the facts of the case, as “[p]rocedural requirements 
established by Congress for gaining access to the federal courts are 
not to be disregarded by courts out of a vague sympathy for 
particular litigants.”291  Courts make fact-based determinations as 
to the application of equitable doctrines in cases involving discrete 
acts, with the general presumption favoring adherence to the 
statute of limitations. 
The unlawful employment practices involved in hostile work 
environment claims can span years and a single offensive act 
within a pattern of hostility may not rise to the level of an 
actionable offense.292  The Court allows a plaintiff to base a suit on 
individual acts that occurred outside the statute of limitations, if 
those acts support the single unlawful employment practice of a 
hostile work environment. 293   “The statute does not separate 
individual acts that are part of the hostile environment claim from 
the whole for the purposes of timely filing and liability.”294  In 
cases arising from repeated conduct, courts are not as strictly 
bound to the period delineated by the statute of limitations as in 
cases involving discrete acts, but rather may allow equitable 
doctrines, including laches, to evaluate conduct over an extended 
span of time. 
The Court concluded that though the statutory filing period 
applies more strictly to plaintiffs raising claims of discrete 
discriminatory or retaliatory acts than to those alleging a hostile 
work environment, in neither case are courts precluded from 
applying equitable doctrines that affect the time period in which a 
plaintiff may bring a claim.295  The statutory filing period is not a 
strict prerequisite in bringing a federal claim, but rather, it is a 
requirement subject to waiver, estoppel, equitable tolling, and 
laches, “when equity so requires.” 296   In National Railroad 
Passenger Corp., these equitable doctrines, including laches, 
promoted the remedial purpose of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 
                                                                                                             
291 Baldwin Cnty. Welcome Center v. Brown, 466 U.S. 147, 152 (1984). 
292 Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 536 U.S. at 115. 
293 Id. at 117–18. 
294 Id. at 118. 
295 Id. at 122. 
296 Id. at 121 (citing Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 398 (1982)). 
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of 1964, “without negating the particular purpose of the filing 
requirement, to give prompt notice to the employer.” 297   The 
stricter application of the statutory filing period for discrete 
discriminatory acts and higher availability of equitable doctrines in 
hostile work environment claims involving repeated conduct 
translates into the Copyright law. 
B. The Availability of Laches in Copyright Infringement Cases 
Before Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer  
1. Weighing the Remedial Purpose of the Copyright Act 
Against the Particular Purpose of the Statute of Limitations 
The Supreme Court addressed the availability of equitable 
doctrines, including laches, in claims filed within Title VII’s 
statute of limitations in National Railroad Passenger Corp.  If 
applying an equitable doctrine promotes the remedial purpose of 
the statute “without negating the particular purpose of the filing 
requirement,” the Court deems the use acceptable.298  The remedial 
purpose of the Copyright Act allows “[t]he legal or beneficial 
owner of an exclusive right under a copyright . . . to institute an 
action for any infringement of that particular right committed 
while he or she is the owner of it.”299  The Copyright Act outlines 
specific remedies in § 502 to § 505, including “injunctions,” 
“impounding and disposition of infringing articles,” “damages and 
profits,” and “costs and attorney’s fees.”300  Congress determined it 
“highly desirable to provide a uniform (limitations) period 
throughout the United States” that would deter forum shopping in 
copyright claims and enacted a statute of limitations in 1957.301  
The disagreement across the circuits of the availability of laches 
negates the “particular purpose” of the filing requirement, as it 
encourages forum shopping.302  The availability of laches in certain 
circuits and not others in comparable cases undermines the aim of 
                                                                                                             
297 Id. 
298 Id. (in Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., it was Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964). 
299 17 U.S.C. § 501(b) (2012). 
300 17 U.S.C. §§ 502–05 (2012). 
301 S. REP. NO. 85-1014, at 2 (1957), reprinted in 1957 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1961, 1962. 
302 Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 536 U.S. at 121. 
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the statute of limitations to create a national uniformity, as regional 
differences remain. 
Congressional materials accompanying the addition of the 
statute of limitations to the Copyright Act illuminate the intent of 
the 1957 amendment to the Copyright Act.  The Senate Report 
addressed the differences in state law for areas with a high number 
of copyright cases and those with few.303  Specifically, the Senate 
Report addressed the favoritism California showed to the film 
industry, a trend continued to this day with the Ninth Circuit’s 
presumption in favor of laches.304  Laches allows studios to bar 
infringement claims brought by copyright owners whose works 
achieved financial success after a significant period of time.305  
One interpretation of National Railroad Passenger Corp. focuses 
on the purpose of the statute in deciding the availability of laches.  
While several circuits cite separation of powers concerns that 
laches works against the particular purpose of the Copyright Act’s 
statute of limitations, circumstances arise in copyright cases when 
the strict application of the statute of limitations does not result in a 
fair outcome. 
2. The Differential Treatment of Discrete Acts of 
Infringement and Continuing Acts of Infringement 
In National Railroad Passenger Corp., the Court stated that 
“[t]he statutory filing period is not a strict prerequisite” 306  in 
bringing a federal claim, but rather, it is a requirement subject to 
waiver, estoppel, equitable tolling, and laches, “when equity so 
requires.” 307   In considering appropriate standards for applying 
equitable doctrines, the Court distinguished between “[d]iscrete 
acts such as termination, failure to promote, denial of transfer, or 
refusal to hire” which “are easy to identify” and “hostile 
environment claims” the very nature of which “involves repeated 
conduct.” 308   A second interpretation of National Railroad 
                                                                                                             
303 S. REP NO. 85-1014, at 2. 
304 Id. 
305 Id. 
306 Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 103 (2002) (citing Zipes v. 
Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 398 (1982)). 
307 Id. 
308 Id. at 114–15; see also 1 B. LINDEMANN & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 289, at 348–49. 
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Passenger Corp. allows for a spectrum of availability based on the 
type of conduct, as the Supreme Court differentiates between 
discrete acts and repeated conduct in their assessing the application 
of equitable doctrines.  The Court allows a plaintiff to base a suit 
on individual acts that occurred outside the statute of limitations, if 
those acts support the single unlawful employment practice of a 
hostile work environment.309 
In the leading cases across several circuits, the courts address 
copyright claims analogous to discrete acts, “easy to identify” 
infringements that do not stem from the licensing of underlying 
works, and the production, distribution, release, and re-release of 
derivative works, often continuing over a period of many years and 
involving repeated infringing acts.310  The availability of laches in 
copyright claims analogous to discrete acts of discrimination is 
subject to varying restrictions across the circuits.  The Fourth 
Circuit does not allow laches for copyright infringement claims 
brought within the statute of limitations 311  in deference to the 
“definitive” aims of the federal statute.312  The Eleventh Circuit 
recognizes laches “only in the most extraordinary 
circumstances”313 and holds a “strong presumption that a plaintiff’s 
suit is timely if it is filed before the statute of limitations has 
run.”314 These “extraordinary circumstances” 315 include claims in 
which an owner “cannot be fully cognizant of all infringements 
that occur throughout the length and breadth of this country.”316  In 
those claims, “laches serves as a bar only to the recovery of 
retrospective damages, not to prospective relief.”317  Similarly, the 
                                                                                                             
309 Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 536 U.S. at 117–18. 
310 Id.; see, e.g., Peter Letterese & Assocs., Inc. v. World Inst. of Scientology Enters. 
Int’l, 533 F.3d 1287 (11th Cir. 2008); Chirco v. Crosswinds Cmtys., Inc., 474 F.3d 227 
(6th Cir. 2007); Jacobsen v. Deseret Book Co., 287 F.3d 936 (10th Cir. 2002); Lyons 
P’ship, L.P. v. Morris Costumes, Inc., 243 F.3d 789 (4th Cir. 2001); New Era Publ’ns 
Int’l v. Henry Holt & Co., 873 F.2d 576 (2d Cir. 1989). 
311 Lyons P’ship, 243 F.3d at 796. 
312 Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 395 (1946). 
313 Peter Letterese & Assocs., 533 F.3d at 1320. 
314 Id. 
315 Id. 
316 Id. at 1321; see A.C. Aukerman Co. v. R.L. Chaides Constr. Co., 960 F.2d 1020, 
1040–41 (Fed. Cir. 1992). 
317 Peter Letterese & Assocs., 533 F.3d at 1321. 
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Tenth Circuit reserves laches for “rare cases.”318  The Sixth Circuit 
generally reserves the defense for only “the most compelling of 
cases.”319  While holding a presumptive deference to the statute of 
limitations, outside of the Fourth Circuit’s strict bar, several 
circuits do allow laches in “what can best be described as unusual 
circumstances.”320  The inconsistent availability of laches across 
the circuits in cases involving discrete infringing acts represents 
one significant conflict.  This inconsistency diminishes Congress’s 
aim of establishing uniformity in copyright cases through the 
statute of limitations. 
The Ninth Circuit’s leading cases deal with continuing acts of 
infringements subject to the “separate accrual rule.”321  Under the 
separate accrual rule, the three-year period specified by the statute 
of limitations322 accrues separately for each infringing act, even if 
the violation is one in a series of continuing acts of 
infringement. 323   These claims are analogous to hostile work 
environment claims in that they involve repeated conduct, 
evaluated in its totality in determining the validity of a claim.324 
A conflict exists between the circuits over the remedies laches 
bars in copyright claims brought within the statute of limitations.  
In the Second Circuit, laches bars injunctive relief, while allowing 
a plaintiff to pursue a claim for monetary damages.325   In the 
Eleventh Circuit, “laches serves as a bar only to the recovery of 
                                                                                                             
318 Jacobsen v. Deseret Book Co., 287 F.3d 936, 950–51 (10th Cir. 2002). 
319 Chirco v. Crosswinds Cmtys., Inc., 474 F.3d 227, 233 (6th Cir. 2007). 
320 Id. at 234. 
321 See 3 NIMMER, supra note 121, § 12.05[B][1][b] (“If infringement occurred within 
three years prior to filing, the action will not be barred even if prior infringements by the 
same party as to the same work are barred because they occurred more than three years 
previously.”); Brief for Petitioner at 23, Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 134 S. 
Ct. 50 (2013) (No. 12-1315) (“No court has required a copyright action seeking relief for 
an infringement within the past three years to be brought within three years of the initial 
act of infringement.” (citing 6 WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 20:23 (West. 
2013))). 
322 See 17 U.S.C. § 507(b) (2012). 
323 See Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., No. CV 09-72 (MANx) (C.D. Cal. Feb. 
3, 2010) at 14. 
324 See generally Danjaq L.L.C. v. Sony Corp., 263 F.3d 942 (9th Cir. 2001); Petrella v. 
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., No. 10-55834 (9th Cir. Aug. 29, 2012). 
325 See New Era Publ’ns Int’l v. Henry Holt & Co., 873 F.2d 576, 584–85 (2d Cir. 
1989). 
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retrospective damages, not to prospective relief.”326  Laches in the 
Sixth Circuit bars injunctive relief that causes “unjust hardship,” 
not necessarily injunctive relief generally, or damages.327  In the 
Ninth Circuit, laches can bar claims for damages and injunctive 
relief. 328   The discrepancy over the remedies laches bars 
exacerbates the forum shopping concerns resulting from the circuit 
split over availability. 
3. Challenges in Balancing the Role of Equity and the Aims 
of the Law in Copyright 
While “[t]here is nothing in the copyright statute or its history 
to indicate that laches is a proper defense to a suit brought under 
the Act,”329 the role of equity begins where the effectiveness of 
statutory provisions ends.  The circuits restricting the availability 
of laches do so in deference to the law, as codified in the Copyright 
Act’s statute of limitations.  Laches, a determination made by the 
district courts based on the facts in each case, creates an element of 
unpredictability in Copyright law.  The purpose of updating the 
Copyright Act to include the statute of limitations, an amendment 
Congress accepted using language identical to the 1957 
amendment into the 1976 Copyright Act, 330  was to create a 
national uniformity for copyright claims.  This uniformity aimed to 
avoid the unpredictability and forum shopping created by using 
state statute of limitations in copyright cases. 
The Ninth Circuit presumes the availability of laches, as it 
supports commercial morality in conflicts between copyright 
owners and parties exploiting copyrights, who often invest 
significant resources into the production and distribution of works.  
To achieve equitable results, the Ninth Circuit borrows rules that 
function in Trademark law without creating separation of powers 
issues and applies them to Copyright law, where their availability 
creates a tension with congressionally enacted statutes.  
                                                                                                             
326 Peter Letterese & Assoc., Inc. v. World Inst. of Scientology Enter. Int’l, 533 F.3d 
1287, 1321 (11th Cir. 2008). 
327 See Chirco v. Crosswinds Cmtys., Inc., 474 F.3d 227, 236 (6th Cir. 2007). 
328 See Danjaq L.L.C. v. Sony Corp., 263 F.3d 942, 960 (9th Cir. 2001). 
329 Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 695 F.3d 946, 958 (9th Cir. 2012), cert. 
granted, 134 S. Ct. 50 (2013). 
330 See id. (citing to Pub. L. No. 94-553, § 507(b), 90 Stat. 2541, 2586). 
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Additionally, the Ninth Circuit selects elements of the continuing 
wrongs approach and the rolling statute of limitations and applies 
them when advantageous.  In so heavily favoring equity, the Ninth 
Circuit developed a schism with the other circuits in applying 
laches.  The conflicts among the circuits over the availability of 
laches returned Copyright law to this unpredictability.   
III. RESOLVING THE SPLIT OVER THE AVAILABILITY OF LACHES 
ACROSS THE CIRCUITS BY DISTINGUISHING BETWEEN TYPES OF 
INFRINGEMENT CLAIMS 
To resolve the circuit split over the availability of laches in 
civil copyright claims brought within the Copyright Act’s statute 
of limitations, the Supreme Court, in deciding Petrella, should 
have distinguished between claims involving discrete infringing 
acts and claims arising out of continuing acts of infringement.  In 
National Railroad Passenger Corp., the Court stated that equitable 
doctrines should be more readily available in claims with repeated 
discriminatory conduct than those involving discrete acts of 
discrimination.  Discrete acts of infringement, like discrete acts of 
discrimination, should be evaluated with stricter adherence to the 
Copyright Act’s statute of limitations, restricting the availability of 
equitable doctrines, including laches, to rare cases.  The Court 
should have held that the availability of laches in Petrella to bar 
equitable relief, a case arising from continuing acts of 
infringement, should be treated with the same leniency afforded 
the availability of equitable doctrines in discrimination claims 
involving repeated conduct. 
A. Claims Involving Discrete Acts of Infringement 
The availability of laches should be restricted in copyright 
cases involving discrete acts of infringement.  The stricter 
adherence to statutory provisions in applying equitable doctrines in 
discrimination claims based on discrete acts translates into 
copyright.  In claims addressing discrete acts of infringement, 
laches should only be available in rare circumstances.  Rare 
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circumstances could involve decades of delay, 331  “extreme 
prejudice,” 332  or when injunctive relief would cause “unjust 
hardship.” 333   For discrete acts of infringement, the reasonable 
standard for the availability of laches falls somewhere between the 
Fourth Circuit’s absolute bar 334  and the Ninth Circuit’s 
presumptive yes.335  “Rather than deciding cases on the issue of 
laches, courts should generally defer to the three-year statute of 
limitations, 17 U.S.C. § 507(b), provided by the Copyright Act.”336  
Beyond this general deference, the Sixth, Tenth, and Eleventh 
Circuits determine if the laches defense is available based on the 
effects of the plaintiffs’ delay in relation to the remedy sought.337  
Laches should be available as a bar to equitable remedies, with 
claimants free to pursue legal relief, if circumstances permit.338  As 
laches is a fact-based case-by-case determination, it is sufficient 
framework to suggest that the presumption in favor of the statute 
of limitations is a guiding principle and courts are left to decide the 
rare exceptions of availability relying on the facts of the infringing 
acts and the laches elements. 
B. Claims Arising from Continuing Acts of Infringement 
Laches should be presumed available in copyright cases arising 
from continuing acts of infringement.  The leniency in applying 
equitable doctrines afforded discrimination claims of repeated 
conduct translates into copyright.  “[T]he special circumstance of 
                                                                                                             
331 See Peter Letterese & Assocs., 533 F.3d at 1321; see also discussion supra Part 
I.D.2. 
332 Jacobsen v. Deseret Book Co., 287 F.3d 936, 949 (10th Cir. 2002); see discussion 
supra Part I.D.3. 
333 Chirco v. Crosswinds Cmtys., Inc., 474 F.3d 227, 236 (6th Cir. 2007); see also 
discussion supra Part I.D.4. 
334 See Lyons P’ship, L.P. v. Morris Costumes, Inc., 243 F.3d 789 (4th Cir. 2001); see 
also discussion supra Part I.D.1. 
335 See Danjaq L.L.C. v. Sony Corp., 263 F.3d 942, 951 (9th Cir. 2001); Kling v. 
Hallmark Cards, Inc., 225 F.3d 1030, 1036–42 (9th Cir. 2000); Jackson v. Axton, 25 F.3d 
884, 888 (9th Cir. 1994); see also discussion supra Part I.D.6. 
336 Jacobsen, 287 F.3d at 950; Chirco, 474 F.3d at 232. 
337 See Chirco, 474 F.3d. at 227; Peter Letterese & Assocs., Inc. v. World Inst. of 
Scientology Enters. Int’l, 533 F.3d 1287 (11th Cir. 2008); Jacobsen, 287 F.3d at 936; 
New Era Publ’ns Int’l v. Henry Holt & Co., 873 F.2d 576 (2d Cir. 1989). 
338 See discussion supra Part II.B.2. 
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re-releases”339  and analogous repeated conduct, common in the 
Ninth Circuit, but relatively rare in other circuits, 340  requires 
standards different from discrete acts of copyright infringement.  
Laches should be available to allow a defendant to conduct 
business without being subject to prejudice as a result of a 
plaintiff’s unreasonable delay in bringing a claim.  Without this 
allowance, the use of copyrighted material, even if properly 
licensed at the time of transfer, would cause trepidation for parties 
aiming to exploit copyrighted works.  As each infringement starts 
the statute of limitations running anew and without the availability 
of laches, copyright owners could delay initiating claims 
indefinitely.  Laches should be available as a bar to equitable 
remedies, while allowing plaintiffs to pursue legal remedies.  The 
availability of laches in copyright cases arising from continuing 
acts of infringement would likely promote fairness and increase 
predictability for parties transacting in copyrighted material.  
Without laches, parties seeking declaratory judgments would 
abound and cause an undue burden to courts in the Ninth Circuit, 
Second Circuit, and beyond. 
C. The Supreme Court’s Holding in Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-
Mayer, Inc. 
The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit’s decision, 
holding that laches cannot bar a claim for damages, but can 
preclude a claim for equitable relief in extraordinary 
circumstances.341  The decision remands the case to the district 
court and offers that “a plaintiff’s delay can always be brought to 
bear at the remedial stage, in determining appropriate injunctive 
relief, and in assessing the ‘profits of the infringer [] attributable to 
the infringement.’” 342  To illustrate these extraordinary 
circumstances, the Court relies on cases that effectively render 
laches largely obsolete. 343   The Petrella decision relegates a 
                                                                                                             
339   Danjaq, 263 F.3d at 954; see discussion supra Part I.C.2. 
340   See S. REP. NO. 85-1014, at 2 (1957), reprinted in 1957 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1961, 1962; 
see also discussion supra Part I.C.2. 
341   Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., No. 12-1315, 2014 WL 2011574, at *4 
(U.S. May 19, 2014). 
342   Id. (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 504(b) (2012)).   
343 Id. at *12. 
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plaintiff’s extensive delay in bringing suit to one of many factors 
taken into account at the district court level.344  Alternately, the 
Court tasks the defendant with satisfying the “more exacting” and 
“differently oriented” test for estoppel to present an equitable 
defense against a copyright claim brought within the statute of 
limitations.345 
The Court adopts the Second Circuit’s approach, as applied in 
New Era Publications International, ApS v. Henry Holt & Co.,346 
which distinguishes between the availability of laches to bar 
equitable relief, but not legal relief.  This case contributes to the 
definition of “extraordinary” as circumstances that would result in 
the “total destruction of the work.”347 The Court clarifies these 
extraordinary circumstances by citing Chirco v. Crosswinds 
Communities, Inc., a case which limits the availability of laches to 
injunctive relief that would “‘work an unjust hardship’ upon 
defendants and third parties.” 348   By defining extraordinary 
circumstances exclusively through these two cases, the Court 
appears to circumscribe the application of laches to bar injunctive 
relief that would manifest physically, an unreasonable standard for 
copyright claims.  
Assessing laches for claims brought within the statute of 
limitations requires determining when the statute of limitations 
begins running and from what point a court measures the plaintiff’s 
delay.  The Court states “[a] copyright claim thus arises or 
‘accrue[s]’ when an infringing act occurs.”349  This statement is 
incorrect in the vast majority of circuits, including the Ninth 
Circuit350 and Second Circuit,351 where the “discovery rule”352 — 
                                                                                                             
344  Id. at *13. 
345  Id. at *11–12. 
346  873 F.2d 576 (2d Cir. 1989). 
347  Petrella, 2014 WL 2011574, at *12–13 (citing New Era Publ’ns Int’l v. Henry Holt 
& Co., 873 F.2d 576, 584–85 (2d Cir. 1989)).  
348  Id. at *12 (citing Chirco v. Crosswinds Comtys., Inc., 474 F.3d 227, 236 (6th Cir. 
2007). 
349  Id. at *5. 
350  Kling v. Hallmark Cards, Inc., 225 F.3d 1030, 1036 (9th Cir. 2000). 
351  Anandashankar Mazumdar, ‘Discovery’ Rule Applies to Copyright Statute of 
Limitations in Second Circuit, BLOOMBERG BNA (Apr. 9, 2014), http://www.bna.com/
discovery-rule-applies-n17179889472. 
352  William A. Graham Co. v. Haughey, 568 F.3d 425, 433 (3d Cir. 2009). 
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when a defendant knew or should have known about the alleged 
infringing act at issue—applies. 353   The Court departs from 
previous methods for measuring the end of a plaintiff’s delay 
without offering clarification beyond the assumption that a plaintiff 
notifying a defendant of a potential claim suffices. 354   In 
minimizing the consequences of Petrella’s delay, the Court states 
she “notified MGM of her copyright claims before MGM invested 
millions of dollars in creating a new edition of Raging Bull.”355  
Previously, a plaintiff needed to file a claim to end delay, and even 
then, claims regarding the same work, but against parties the court 
considered too attenuated to the present action, did not “stop the 
clock” on laches. 356   The Court may favor the injury rule for 
infringement accrual or intend to modify the action necessary to 
signal the end of a plaintiff’s delay.  However, it is possible the 
decision marginalizes the application of laches to a point where 
these issues will rarely arise. 
The Court minimizes the potential harm of allowing a plaintiff 
to proceed absent the threat of threshold dismissal for delay, citing 
that under the separate accrual rule, the statute of limitations 
allows a plaintiff to reach back only three years and “the infringer 
is insulated from liability for earlier infringements of the same 
work.”357  The Court notes, “when a defendant has engaged (or is 
alleged to have engaged) in a series of discrete infringing acts, the 
copyright holder’s suit ordinarily will be timely under § 507 (b) 
with respect to more recent acts of infringement . . . but untimely 
with respect to prior acts of the same or similar kind.”358  The 
Court distinguishes between separately accruing harm and harm 
from past violations that are continuing,359 noting that “each new 
act must cause ‘harm [to the plaintiff] over and above the harm that 
the earlier acts caused,’”360  while in continuing harm cases, “a 
                                                                                                             
353  Kling, 225 F.3d at 1036. 
354  Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., No. 12-1315, 2014 WL 2011574, at *13 
(U.S. May 19, 2014). 
355  Id. 
356  Danjaq LLC v. Sony Corp., 263 F.3d 942, 953 (9th Cir. 2001). 
357  Petrella, 2014 WL 2011574, at *6. 
358  Id. 
359  Id. at *6 n.6. 
360  Id. (quoting Klehr v. A.O. Smith Corp., U.S. 179, 190 (U.S. 1997)). 
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plaintiff [] challenges [] an unlawful practice that continues into 
the limitations period.”361  The Court maintains that a defendant 
engaging in a continuing series of infringing acts of the same or 
similar kind commits “discrete acts independently actionable.”362  
An initial infringing act, followed by continuing acts of the same 
or similar kind will not constitute conduct cumulative in effect, the 
Court’s description of the hostile environment claims pursued 
under Title VII in National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. 
Morgan.363  Previously, the Ninth Circuit included knowledge of 
“impending copyright infringements” along with “knowledge of 
actual infringement” to determine when the period to measure 
delay for laches begins. 364   The Court declines to distinguish 
between delay in bringing suit over infringing acts occurring only 
once and those persisting over decades (and thus continually 
impending).  By minimizing the potential harm resulting from 
allowing a plaintiff’s delayed claim to proceed, the Court 
incentivizes copyright owners to withhold filing their claims, 
encouraging increased delay in the assertion of rights in a work, 
and engendering a climate of unpredictability.  
The circumstances of Petrella’s delay in bringing suit fit those 
of the hypothetical “inequitable” copyright owner imagined by 
Judge Hand in Haas.365  Petrella, “the owner of a copyright, with 
full notice of an intended infringement” since 1991, delayed 
initiating litigation without reasonable cause until 2010.366  Petrella 
owns one of the possible underlying Raging Bull copyrights as a 
result of the Stewart v. Abend decision, which held that when an 
author dies before the renewal period begins, his successors are 
entitled to the renewal rights, even if the author assigned the 
renewal rights to another party.367  Petrella stood “inactive” during 
                                                                                                             
361  Id. (quoting Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 380–81 (1982)). 
362 Id. at *6 n.7 (quoting Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 114–21 
(2002)). 
363  Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 536 U.S. at 115. 
364  Kling v. Hallmark Cards Inc., 225 F.3d 1030, 1038 (9th Cir. 2000). 
365  See Haas v. Leo Feist, Inc., 234 F. 105, 108 (S.D.N.Y. 1916). 
366  Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., No. CV 09-72-GW (MANx), at 45a (C.D. 
Cal. Feb. 3, 2010) (citing Danjaq, LLC v. Sony Corp., 263 F.3d 942, 951 (9th Cir. 
2001)).  
367 Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207 (1990). 
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this extended period of delay while Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, the 
“proposed infringer,” spent “large sums of money” on the 
exploitation of Petrella’s father’s work.368  Petrella, “intervene[d] 
only when [her] speculation . . . proved a success.”369  In fact, 
Petrella “testified that she refrained from filing suit at that time 
[1991] because [Raging Bull] was not yet profitable.”370  Petrella’s 
inaction evokes the plaintiff who “sleeps upon [her] rights,”371 
gauging profitability instead of promptly asserting her interest in 
the work.  The Court concludes that “there is nothing untoward 
about waiting to see whether an infringer’s exploitation undercuts 
the value of the copyrighted work, has no effect on the original 
work, or even complements it.”372 
Because Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. continues to exploit 
Raging Bull and, arguably, the underlying works created by her 
father, without laches, Petrella could have conceivably delayed for 
years longer in initiating litigation.  The Academy-Award winning 
film 373  at the center of this controversy, widely considered by 
critics as one of the greatest of all-time,374 remains popular to date.  
The Film is held in high-regard in the motion picture industry and 
is considered a significant work in American culture, deemed 
“culturally, historically, and aesthetically significant” by the 
United States Library of Congress.375  The Film continues to prove 
                                                                                                             
368  Id. 
369  Haas, 234 F. at 108. 
370  Petrella, No. CV 09-72 (MANx). 
371  S. Pac. Co. v. Bogert, 250 U.S. 483, 500 (1919) (McReynolds, J., dissenting) 
(quoting Hayward v. Eliot Nat'l Bank, 96 U.S. 611 (1877)). 
372  Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., No. 12-1315, 2014 WL 2011574, at *10 
(U.S. May 19, 2014). 
373 Raging Bull was nominated for eight Academy Awards and won two, including a 
Best Actor award for Robert De Niro (in the role of Jake LaMotta) and Best Editor award 
for Thelma Schoonmaker. See The 53rd Academy Awards (1981) Nominees and Winners, 
THE OSCARS, http://www.oscars.org/awards/academyawards/legacy/ceremony/53rd.html 
(last visited Jan. 21, 2014). 
374 Raging Bull is ranked fourth on the 100 greatest movies of all-time, by a jury of 
1,500 film artists, critics and historians. AFI’s 100 Years...100 Movies – 10th Anniversary 
Edition, AFI.COM http://www.afi.com/100years/movies10.aspx (last visited Jan. 21, 
2014).  
375  Barbara Gamarekian, Library of Congress Adds 25 Titles to National Film Registry, 
N.Y. TIMES, October 19, 1990, http://www.nytimes.com/1990/10/19/movies/library-of-
congress-adds-25-titles-to-national-film-registry.html. 
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marketable to audiences.376   Without laches, Petrella can delay 
until she determines the most financially beneficial time to assert 
her rights, filing “precisely when net revenues turned positive.”377  
A copyright owner, free to delay legal action without consequence, 
could put off negotiating a license until the alleged infringing party 
“invests time, effort, and resources into making the derivative 
product,” at which point the copyright owner will be in a position 
of strength to “obtain favorable licensing terms through 
settlement.”378  Though the Court posits that, “[i]f the rule were . . . 
‘sue soon, or forever hold your peace,’ copyright owners would 
have to mount a federal case fast to stop seemingly innocuous 
infringements,”379 opening the door for unchecked delay promotes 
an uncertain and needlessly hostile market where entities that 
create and promote works would need to seek battery of 
declaratory judgments before investing in the development of a 
copyrighted work.   
The Court finds that the “consequences of [Petrella’s] delay in 
commencing suit” were not of “sufficient magnitude to warrant, at 
the very outset of the litigation, curtailment of the relief equitably 
awardable.”380  The Court, failing to identify harm analogous to the 
“total destruction of the work” of New Era Publications 
International381 or injunctive relief that would “‘work an unjust 
hardship’ upon defendants and third parties” like that in Chirco v. 
Crosswinds Communities, Inc.,382 holds that the circumstances “are 
not sufficiently extraordinary to justify threshold dismissal.”383  As 
the case was remanded, the Court notes, “should Petrella 
ultimately prevail on the merits, the district court, in determining 
                                                                                                             
376 The film has been re-released in 25th Anniversary and 30th Anniversary special 
edition DVDs. See Raging Bull 25th Anniversary Special Edition, THE DIGITAL FIX FILM 
(Feb. 25, 2005, 2:00 PM), http://film.thedigitalfix.com/content/id/56279/raging-bull-
25th-anniversary-special-edition.html. 
377  Petrella, 2014 WL 2011574, at *16. 
378  Id. 
379  Id. at *10. 
380  Id. at *12. 
381  Id. at *12–13 (citing New Era Publ’ns Int’l v. Henry Holt & Co., 873 F.2d 576, 
584–85 (2d Cir. 1989).  
382  Id. at *12 (quoting Chirco v. Crosswinds Cmtys., Inc., 474 F.3d 227, 236 (6th Cir. 
2007). 
383  Id. at *13. 
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appropriate injunctive relief and assessing profits, may take into 
account her delay in commencing suit.”384  The opinion states that 
the district court “should closely examine MGM’s alleged reliance 
on Petrella’s delay.” 385   As the defendant’s reliance on the 
plaintiff’s conduct to its detriment is an element of estoppel,386 this 
statement suggests that defendants aiming to invoke a defense 
against the inequities previously addressed by laches must now 
rely on equitable estoppel.  In the dissenting opinion, Justice 
Breyer notes, “[w]here due to the passage of time, evidence 
favorable to the defense has disappeared or the defendant has 
continued to invest in a derivative work, what misleading 
representation by the plaintiff is there to stop?” 387   Short of 
construing a plaintiff’s failure to file a claim with knowledge of 
infringing acts as a misleading representation that he will never 
file, this element appears absent in cases where the defendant 
would have invoked laches.  In carving out the “little place” for 
laches in copyright claims, the Court, thinking another equitable 
doctrine might fit, measured too small.388 
CONCLUSION 
The conflicts over the availability of laches come down to 
conflicts over law and equity.  The bright-line law of the statute of 
limitations states the three-year time limit in which to bring a civil 
claim of copyright infringement.  The accompanying congressional 
materials clearly set out the issues the statute of limitations 
intended to resolve and the amendment’s purpose of establishing 
national uniformity.  Closer examination of the effects of this 
uniformity when applied to continuing acts of infringement make 
clear the need for the availability of laches. Because the statute of 
limitations could effectively run forever on continuing 
                                                                                                             
384  Id.  
385  Id.  
386  See Lego A/S v. Best-Lock Const. Toys, Inc., 874 F. Supp. 2d 75, 81 (D. Conn. 
2012). 
387  Petrella, 2014 WL 2011574, at *20. 
388  Id. at *12 (citing 1 DAN B. DOBBS, DOBBS’ LAW OF REMEDIES: DAMAGES – EQUITY - 
RESTITUTION §2.6(1) (2d ed. 1993)).	
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infringements, the equitable doctrine of laches is beneficial to 
mitigate the negative effects of a plaintiff’s delay.  
The Petrella decision restricts the availability of laches to 
extraordinary circumstances.  The Court narrowly defines these 
circumstances, nearly eliminating laches from copyright entirely.  
The Court states that “[a]llowing Petrella’s suit to go forward . . . 
will work no unjust hardship on innocent third parties, such as 
consumers who have purchased copies of Raging Bull.”389  The 
troubling notion arises that the Court requires that sufficient harm 
occur to the physical embodiments of the copyrighted expression 
at issue for the extraordinary circumstances to exist.  Injunctions to 
pulp copies of the Bare-Faced Messiah book, tear down occupied 
condominiums, or, Justice Ginsburg’s hypothetical seizure of 
consumers’ copies of Raging Bull, comprise the total destruction of 
work or unjust hardship of extraordinary circumstances.  Given the 
evolution of technology compelling copyrighted expression away 
from physical copies, the Court’s holding renders a defendant 
vulnerable to opportunistic plaintiffs in myriad scenarios already 
easily imaginable.  If, given Petrella’s lengthy delay and Metro-
Goldwyn-Mayer’s substantial investment, injunctive relief would 
not work the unjust hardship upon defendants and third parties 
necessary to constitute extraordinary circumstances, it is 
foreseeable that this decision’s extraordinary circumstances 
standard aims to effectively eliminate defenses against inequitable 
delay altogether.  
Fairness dictates that laches should be more widely available 
than this decision allows.  Without laches, potential claimants can 
delay initiating litigation, waiting for an opportune time to 
capitalize on another’s toil.  The adverse effect this delay could 
have on those parties investing resources in copyrighted works is 
substantial.  The motions for declaratory judgments and defenses 
against long-incubating claims will abound.  This increase in 
litigation can only offer limited certainty.  Without any assurance 
over an indefinite period of time that an infringement claim will 
not appear, parties who would traditionally license and exploit 
copyrighted works may hesitate in doing so out of fear that a 
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potential claimant could attempt to assert rights in a profitable 
work at any future point.  A decrease in the use of copyrighted 
material would negatively affect parties producing, distributing, 
and exploiting copyrighted works, who may find themselves 
limited to using economically advantageous alternatives, and 
creators, who may find themselves out of work.  The Petrella 
decision will likely have a detrimental effect on the promotion of 
the progress of authors’ works in the future, working an unjust 
hardship on the potential defendants involved in the development 
of copyrightable works and third-party consumers left with 
diminished options.  Non-existence of works of the same caliber as 
Raging Bull nets the same result as total destruction.   
 
